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vAbstract 
Mapping the Denial of Space: 
Latinos and United States Immigration Law 
Paul Conan Flynn, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2017 
Supervisor:  Rebecca M. Torres 
Immigration legal spaces such as courtrooms and national borders are constructed by the 
geopolitical tensions that exist between U.S. nationalism and foreign bodies traversing its 
territory. Mexican, Guatemalan, Salvadorian, and Hondurans—referred to as Latinos in this 
research—constitute nearly all of deportation from the United States in recent decades. In 
addition to these deportation trends, Latinos are also less likely to receive some form of relief 
from deportation despite increasing violence and political instability in Latin America. 
Immigration law is federal and therefore is supposed to provide the same standards and protocols 
for all nationalities in every immigration court. This thesis investigates how the immigration and 
asylum process is in fact spatialized and biased to regional politics. The connection between 
rituals, myths, and symbols of nationalism in the judgement of Latinos are also examined. A 
 vi 
third component explores how migrant and refugee bodies are codified in immigration law 
through their experiences with immigration legal spaces.  
This thesis uses a mixed methods approach to understanding the spatial processes 
involved in the judgement and deportation of Latinos from the United States. GIS is used to 
validate the uneven geography of immigrant justice and identify specific locations of inequality. 
Reflected in the geospatial analysis, Texas’ courts are places of increased deportations and 
denials of asylum. Ethnographic observations in San Antonio and Pearsall’s courtrooms were 
conducted to extract qualitative information elucidating the asymmetric use of immigration 
enforcement. A second field site in Chicago was chosen to compare the impacts of border 
politics on Latinos in removal hearings. My research finds that immigration legal spaces are 
constructed through the use of nationalist myths and symbols to control the mobility of Latino 
bodies. Moreover, deportations are significantly influenced by geopolitics and the spatial 
relationship of immigration legal spaces.  
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Chapter 1: Opening Statement 
Outside of a Chicago immigration courtroom there sits over a dozen groups of people—
some with families, some with lawyers or social workers, and some by themselves. They are all 
waiting for their hearing before an immigration judge to determine the outcome of their legal 
status; can they stay in the United States, and if so with what rights? However, the collection of 
women and children anxiously awaiting one of the most important decisions of their lives will 
have a hearing that lasts less than eight minutes. This is what is called a master Calendar, the 
first step after being charged with deportability and given a notice to appear in court.  
One after the other, I watched the judge dole out hearing dates extending one, two, even 
three years out. Thirty-two people’s lives and futures were assessed and rescheduled in the same 
mundane bureaucratic manner experienced while waiting to get a driver’s license. The 
consequences of deportation, however, carry toxic anxiety, family separation, economic 
destabilization, torture, rape, and death as potential outcomes. Moreover, immigration law is 
classified as civil law and therefore does not require the government to provide legal 
representation to the respondent—the person in deportation process. This is the unequitable 
assembly line of judgement and exclusion that constitutes the current United States immigration 
legal system.  
The rapid hearings observed in Chicago’s immigration court are not unique. The “rocket 
docket”—named for the swiftness with which asylum seekers are heard and tried—expedites the 
deportation of Latinos. Deportation and asylum denial rates are high across the country, but 
space and scale impact the severity and implementation of immigration enforcement. 
Structurally, the laws regulating immigration and asylum—a complex legal status granted to 
those fleeing various types of persecution— are federal and therefore equally apply to each court 
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and judge. However, the overwhelming proportion of Latinos (Executive Office of Immigration 
Review [EOIR], 2016a) within these legal spaces raises several questions about its equitable 
implementation which are the focus of this thesis: 1) How do the politics of a nationalist and 
securitized United States manifest spatially to influence legal outcomes for Mexican, 
Guatemalan, Honduran, and Salvadorians seeking relief from deportation? 2) By what means are 
rituals, symbols, and myths, related to nationalism, in the courtroom, and other legal places used 
to legitimize the judgement of Latino migrants and refugees? 3) In what way are migrant and 
refugee bodies codified in immigration law? 
A FEMINIST GEO-JURISPRUDENCE  
 This research uses a theoretical framework at the intersection of feminist geography, 
political geography, critical geopolitics, and legal studies that draws on all three disciplines to 
interrogate the complex and enigmatic workings of immigration law and policy. Hyndman 
(2001) proposed at the Annual Canadian Association of Geographers meeting that Feminist 
Geopolitics was not a new discipline, or a reinvented form of existing critical geopolitics, but an 
adjusted method of viewing existing theory. Critical geopolitics questions assumptions about 
scale, territory, nationalism, and power in politics. These scholars (Agnew, 1987; O’ Tuathail, 
1986; O’ Tuathail & Agnew, 1992; Paasi & Prokkola, 2008) have focused on deconstructing the 
notion of the state in politics as a natural homogenous entity, and argued that it serves more as a 
means of enacting power over individuals. Their criticisms fall short of truly acknowledging an 
embodied, feminist conceptualization of scale and individuals in geopolitics, preferring to 
reference a fraternity of scholars, and focus on heads of state (Agnew, 2003; Dalby, 2008; 
Dodds, 1996; O’ Tuathail, 1996).  
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Feminist geopoliticians have addressed these issues in several ways that inform my 
research: they have called for the inclusion of feminism to expose egregious power inequalities 
inherent in state entities (Dixon & Marston, 2011; Hiemstra & Mountz, 2011; Hyndman, 2010a; 
Massaro & Williams, 2013; J. Sharp, 2010; J. P. Sharp, 2013); a relational understanding of scale 
that reads the state as embodied has reconciled power differentials  (Dowler & Sharp, 2010; 
Fluri, 2011; Hyndman, 2012; Pratt & Rosner, 2006; Secor, 2001);  and feminist have challenged 
the designation of men as influential state actors and women as victims of state violence (Fluri, 
2011; Hiemstra & Mountz, 2011; Pratt & Rosner, 2006; Secor, 2001; J. P. Sharp, 2000). 
Furthermore, scholars of feminist geopolitics have emphasized a need for situated geopolitical 
analysis (Hyndman, 2012; J. P. Sharp, 2000) that rejects theorizing from an all knowing position, 
which is non-corporeal and separated from time, and space (Haraway, 1988). Lastly, they have 
campaigned for geopolitical scholarship’s application in social justice (Dixon, 2015; Hiemstra & 
Mountz, 2011; Hyndman, 2001). These insights serve as a powerful framework for analyzing 
Latinos in the U.S. immigration and refugee system.  
Firstly, Latinos face oppressive legislation and heightened securitization aimed at 
exclusion and removal every day. Feminists “want to point to the hidden and insidious workings 
of power throughout the structures of everyday life” (Dowler & Sharp, 2010, p. 167), such as 
those entangled in immigration and asylum geopolitics. Illegal labor has historically proven to be 
a high gain and low risk enterprise for U.S. employers resulting in steady migration from Latin 
America (Castles, de Haas, & Miller, 2014; Massey, Durand, & Pren, 2016). Simultaneously, 
legal immigration reform has stalled by using rhetoric revolving around criminalization and 
national security and ensured an exploitable class based on citizenship and legal status. Despite 
signing on to the 1951 convention on refugees and its 1967 protocols, the United States has 
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manipulated its laws and reconfigured space to circumnavigate its political obligations at the 
expense of Latino asylum seekers (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2014). Fervent border enforcement and 
the denial of legal rights have been decried by many as oppressive and a violation of human 
rights (Hiemstra, 2012; Hyndman, 2005; Mountz, 2015; Piper, 2006). Furthermore, the 
unequitable enforcement and judgement of Latino immigrants and asylum seekers under the 
guise of national security raises questions about how the state constitutes security, and for whom 
(Coleman, 2009; Dowler & Sharp, 2010; Fluri, 2014; Tyner & Henkin, 2014). 
Another critique of critical geopolitics, is that it fails to consider the power residing in 
mundane and individual sources, but rather favors the nation state as the unit of analysis (Dowler 
& Sharp, 2010; Hyndman, 2001, 2004; Massaro & Williams, 2013; Secor, 2001). An 
epistemology rooted in feminist geopolitics, emphasizing the relationship between the global and 
intimate (Hiemstra, 2012) and embodied nature of law (Martin, Scherr, & City, 2010), is paired 
with traditional immigration jurisprudence to resolve this problem and inform my research. My 
thesis “studies up” (Braverman, Blomley, Delaney, & Kedar, 2014; Coleman, 2012b; Harding & 
Norberg, 2005; Massaro & Williams, 2013) the United States by critically reviewing its 
immigration laws and policies. I follow by examining the nuanced expression of geopolitics in 
everyday immigration courtroom practices. Case law is a geopolitical expression constructed 
through the daily lives of migrants and asylum seekers and resonates throughout the U.S. legal 
and political systems. In court anything can be put on display, the deepest held secrets of rape 
and physical brutality are lain bare for questioning and cross examination. These painfully 
intimate cases can persuade a judge to make a precedent ruling that reverberates transnationally 
through migrant and asylum seeking communities. Every case is not a landmark decision, but 
these seemingly routine judgements are in themselves geopolitical.  
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Further criticism of critical geopolitics arose from the paradox where even when scholars 
called for the decentering of geopolitical norms (Agnew, 1987, 1994; O’ Tuathail, 1994) they 
inadvertently perpetuated them (Massaro & Williams, 2013; J. P. Sharp, 2000)—preserving 
masculinist hierarchies of power. Critical geopolitical literature stresses a system where men 
occupy spaces of power, and women are relegated to the “lesser” private sphere unworthy of 
academic discussion. Prior scholarship had often excluded these voices, preferring to focus on 
the “Big Men” (J. P. Sharp, 2000, p. 363) of history. Several feminist scholars (Hiemstra & 
Mountz, 2011; Hyndman, 2001; Massaro & Williams, 2013; J. P. Sharp, 2000) have challenged 
this practice and called for a gendered and racialized interpretation of geopolitics. I have also 
chosen to contribute to feminist scholarship and lend voice to the diverse Latino migrants and 
asylum seekers responsible for the formation of geopolitics through their acts of migrating, 
recounting their narratives in court, and asserting their rights, among other actions. It is 
undeniable that hetero-normative and masculinist institutions have great influence in 
immigration and asylum geopolitics, but the power to enact change must be equally credited to 
underrepresented and often overlooked Latino migrants, asylum seekers, attorneys, and the 
scholars who share their legal spaces. 
Feminist scholars (Hyndman, 2012; J. P. Sharp, 2000) have noted the history of critical 
geopolitics scholars in overlooking their own positions of power in the creation of scientific 
knowledge. Therefore it is important to situate knowledge (Haraway, 1988), and reject 
omniscient or objective positions, to avoid western centric or positivist conclusions (Dixon, 
2014; Harding, 1986; Hyndman, 2004; J. P. Sharp, 2000). To mitigate my own positions of 
power as a Latino male researcher, veteran, U.S. citizen, etc. I have followed other scholar’s 
example by including my biographical context throughout my research (England, 1994; Lawson, 
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1995; Sundberg, 2005). Situating knowledge also alleviates some feminists’ apprehension with 
using quantitative methods (Hodge, 1995; Kwan, 2002b; McLafferty, 2005)—which my research 
partially relies on.  
Quantitative spatial analysis versed in feminist epistemologies is an effective tool for 
empowering immigration attorneys to better defend Latinos and oppose oppressive policy. 
Lawson (1995, p. 453) points out that quantitative methods are an effective “strategy for 
understanding the construction of difference,” and particularly useful in studying immigration 
legal spaces. To answer the call for engaged research, I have provided visual aids and expert 
testimony to immigration attorneys. There is a lack of legal representation for migrants and 
asylum seekers, and existing legislation is entrenched with obstacle for entering legally or 
gaining relief from deportation. Exposing the complexities and inequalities plaguing immigration 
legal spaces is an important step in advocating change for a more inclusive and compassionate 
system where human rights are on par with national security. Moreover, it is important to do so 
while minimizing the perpetuation of masculinist agendas and racial tropes. 
AUTO-BIOGRAPHY OF MIXED METHODS IN LEGAL SPACES 
The combination of professional and personal experiences are what informed the 
methods used in my research. A holistic framework for understanding the dynamics of Latinos in 
legal spaces was found at the intersection of quantitative and qualitative methods. Both were 
utilized to deconstruct the multi-scalar properties of asylum and immigration geopolitics in 
relation to Latinos. Statistics and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) proved a powerful tool 
for analyzing nationwide structural patterns reflecting political agendas, and court ethnographies 
revealed the intimate details about people who struggle in these unjust systems. A third 
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component driving the use of mixed methods were my personal encounters and familiarity with 
legal spaces.  
My father and sister are attorneys, and at last count I had eight other members on his side 
who at some point practiced law. From a young age I was inculcated in the capricious nature of 
the legal system. My view of immigration law was further supported through my mother and her 
family’s Mexican immigration narrative, along with my upbringing in the eastside of San Jose, 
California—a predominantly Mexican, Vietnamese, and Filipino community. This nascent 
autoethnography revealed the importance of narrative and micro-scalar analysis to get at the 
roots of larger societal structures. As a GIS specialist for the Texas Department of Public 
Safety’s (DPS) Intelligence and Counter Terrorism Division (ICT), I spent several years 
investigating smuggling, trafficking, and transnational criminal organizations on the US southern 
border. In this capacity I realized how power-laden spatial analysis, statistics, and their 
visualization can be, the potential for their use in revealing patterns of violence and oppression.  
Many scholars have discussed the epistemological divide that exists in academia between 
quantitative and qualitative methods (Cresswell, 2014; DeLyser & Sui, 2014; Hodge, 1995; 
Knigge & Cope, 2006; Lawson, 1995). However, various feminist scholars have demonstrated 
successful ways to deploy quantitative methods to reveal gendered economic disparities 
(Lawson, 1995; Pratt & Hanson, 2003), deconstruct disempowering ethnic norms (Pavlovskaya 
& Bier, 2012), or campaign for improved healthcare (McLafferty, 2002). In the professional 
world this tension is less pronounced as well, and both methods often work in concert. Northern 
Kentucky’s Health Department (2016) is an example of how GIS, epidemiology, and patient 
narratives are being used to combat the opioid epidemic and provide public health services. I 
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provide a brief biographical context to situate my methodological and epistemological journey 
using quantitative methods in immigration legal spaces (Lawson, 1995). 
GIS: THE METHOD OF GIVING NUMBERS A FACE 
When I initiated this project in 2015 I sought to develop a national picture of removals 
and asylum– in particular as it related to the increase of women and children. I was working for 
DPS during the 2014 “immigration crisis,” and my responsibilities included sorting through 
reports and mapping various crimes along the United States and Mexico border. Human lives 
were obscured in this process, as I am sure were human rights. Prior to working at DPS I served 
in the military where the wide array of surveillance systems I operated to track disembodied 
others produced a gaze from nowhere (Haraway, 1988). These experiences have made me hyper 
aware of the dissociative capabilities of technology and its potential for violence. However, I do 
not consider these experiences to place me at odds with feminist epistemology; they serve as 
reminders of the dangers of hyper-masculinist doctrines. Being cognizant and transparent of this 
fact helps me to prevent positivist and empiricist assumptions about what can be truly known.  
For this thesis I used reported removal data from the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and The Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). Data 
on court removal orders was attained from Syracuse University’s Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse (TRAC) database. These data were used to analyze the spatial distributions and 
temporal patterns of Latino removal and asylum decisions in the United States. These data were 
aggregated by 58 immigration courts into point shapefiles with reliability only until fiscal year 
(October-September) 2015, because of the length of time it takes to compile the reports. My 
research benefited from fairly open access to government data, however, the recent shift in 
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politics—exemplified in the Local Zoning Decisions Protection Act of 2017—foreshadows a 
growing era of restricted data by the federal government. It is still unclear how this new climate 
of information opacity and obfuscation will influence my subsequent research and analysis. I 
compiled information about violence—in general, and towards women and LGBTQ people—in 
Mexico and Central America using the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, and the 
Graduate Institute in Geneva’s Small Arms Survey. These comparative investigations brought to 
light how Latinos are excluded and denied asylum disproportionately when many should qualify. 
Mexicans, in particular are over represented in deportation, because the legal system expedites 
their removal often before the immigrants can gain knowledge of their rights to relief.  
Conducting a quantitative analysis of migration and asylum, where many of those being 
counted have experienced heinous experiences deserving of individual attention, is difficult to 
accomplish in a sensitive, but meaningful manner. I echo Lawson’s (1995) lamentations about 
the difficulty and inherent objectification of categorizing human behavior for geospatial analysis, 
despite more than a decade reflecting on an ethical and appropriate approach. Kwan (2002a) 
proposes inserting reflexivity to GIS analysis to assuage power disparities in academic research. 
Using England’s (1994, p. 244) definition of reflexivity as “self-critical sympathetic 
introspection and the self- conscious analytical scrutiny of the self as researcher” I employed this 
technique to mitigate challenging questions, such as how to qualify “high” and “low” deportation 
rates—essentially making a determination on the number of lives that are acceptable to remove. 
This was most influential, and at times frustrating, in the visual representation of quantitative 
data and analysis. After countless iterations I settled on a cartographic design and method that 
balanced scientific rigor with an interpretation that does not disempower Latinos in immigration 
legal spaces.  
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Research in cartography (Brewer & Campbell, 1998) has shown that people most 
accurately distinguish three symbol sizes in a graduated map and specifically underestimate 
differences in data when they are represented by circles of varying sizes. Circles introduce 
further difficulty in determining differences in size and classification (MacEachren, 1995). These 
two factors compelled me to use three different sizes of squares—determined by QGIS (2016) 
software and then adapted by eye to improve their distinction—for the symbology in my maps. 
The most difficult part of this process was determining the associated data to be represented by 
the size of the squares. The graduated symbols were divided into three quantiles to maximize the 
fact that people better distinguish between small, medium, and large symbols. After much 
grounded visualization—a non-linear process of data gathering, analyzing and representation 
(Knigge & Cope, 2006)—I determined this approach would provide consistency in my analysis. 
This process was weighed against alternatives that included arbitrary classifications based solely 
on my judgement, reliance on GIS software to make the decision, or callous statistical standards 
that only focus on mathematical outliers (beyond three standard deviations).  
METHODS FOR SITUATING COURTROOM SPACES  
The first time I walked into the San Antonio immigration court I was terrified; I was not 
scared because I was at risk of being deported… I was just afraid. The night before attending 
court I wrestled in bed trying to anticipate possible issues and obstacles. I only felt somewhat 
settled after I entered the front doors, walked through the metal detector, passed the armed 
security, found my seat, and received the emotionless acceptance of the immigration judge. The 
discomfort was more than fieldwork jitters, and the question lingered in my mind; why was I so 
anxious? I am a veteran, so it is unlikely that in a hyper-nationalist state, my citizenship and 
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loyalty could be questioned. My familiarity with legal space also should have assuaged my fears; 
my father is an attorney, and as a child I grew up playing in courtrooms after hours. Perhaps my 
race caused some of my apprehension in this new legal space; I am half Mexican and do have 
some Arab features—during my deployment to Iraq our interpreters would not believe that I was 
American. However, these things seemed trivial in relation to the strong feelings this 
immigration court evoked in me. The authority legal places represent, with all of its symbols and 
rituals, are constant reminders of the power the state can exert over the body. I often reflect on 
that visceral reaction and try to comprehend how much more intimidating it must feel to 
outsiders seeking relief and how much more violent the experience is without the privileges of 
my position. 
To counteract my fears I followed all of the codes of behavior inculcated during 
childhood and military service to show respect to the court. I wore a suit with all of the proper 
masculine, white, professional protocols; my tie ended at the center of my buckle, belt was 
threaded to my left, and gig line straight and aligned. I dawned the ceremonial garb necessary to 
grant me access to, and mobility through legal space. Feminist scholars (Hyndman, 2010b; 
Kobayashi, 2001; Mohammad, 2001) have demonstrated how a researcher’s identity in the field 
shape their experience, responses, and consequences. In this fashion I was able to negotiate 
various aspects of my identity (kinship, service, and researcher) to conduct courtroom 
ethnography from a position of an accepted outsider. 
I conducted courtroom ethnographies in San Antonio and Pearsall, Texas as well as 
Chicago’s immigration courts in the spring and summer of 2016 in order to provide a multi-
scalar analysis of Latino’s contact and experiences with legal spaces. During these observations I 
was able to witness a range of immigration judge’s with varying degrees of experience—some 
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had only been a judge for several months, and others for several decades. I was presented with 
the opportunity to be trained to conduct immigration courtroom observations with Dr. Alfonso 
Gonzales from the University of Texas at Austin. During that time we covered ethnographic 
procedures for observing the courtroom. Through his connections with the local immigration 
attorneys and advocates in the Central Texas area, we were able to observe hearings at San 
Antonio and Pearsall detention center’s immigration court. The first training observation was a 
merits hearing petitioning for asylum, and was conducted in conjunction with Dr. Rebecca 
Torres, and Dr. Alfonso Gonzales. These hearings initiate once a person has been found 
inadmissible or removable under the law, leaving them with an opportunity to petition for some 
form of relief. I observed a total of four hearings in Texas, two in San Antonio, and two at 
Pearsall detention center, accompanied by either Dr. Torres or fellow student Aurora Ibarra. 
Field work was conducted mainly over the summer of 2016, with the exception of the final 
merits hearing in San Antonio in fall 2016. Immigration hearings are open to the public, 
however, a judge can chose to make them private if the respondent requests it, or anonymity is 
required for the case. Our attendance was facilitated through the various immigration attorney’s 
Dr. Gonzales worked with over previous years. Most judges were ambivalent to our presence, 
whereas the majority of government attorneys were clearly displeased, and sometimes defiant of 
our presence.  
In order to expand the number of hearings I could observe, and provide a more rounded 
sample of immigration legal spaces, I also conducted courtroom ethnographies in Chicago’s 
immigration court. This provided geographic and political variability from that of Texas and the 
border, while maintaining a large percentage of Latino respondents—over half of observed 
hearings were Latinos. Immigration attorneys had confided that Chicago’s court was much more 
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liberal and farther removed from border politics than courts in Texas. I gained access to the 
Chicago immigration court through my father who is an attorney in the city. The connection and 
access was a primary reason for selecting this as a research site. A Federal Judge my father 
works with, who once served as an immigration judge in Chicago’s court, reached out on my 
behalf to the Chief Immigration Judge for the Midwest. She notified the judges and staff of my 
visit, and I was given much greater access to the court and judges than I had in Texas, where I 
was an outsider. I observed hearings over two days. Judges spent the mornings conducting 
master calendars and used the afternoons for merits hearings. The master calendar is primarily 
administrative in nature and often lasted only a few minutes. The respondents and attorney—if 
they are fortunate to have one— provide some basic facts about their case and are then issued a 
date for a following hearing. Subsequent hearings scheduled could be a merits hearing to petition 
for relief, a bond hearing to get permission to be released from detention (if applicable), or a 
continuance (postponement). During the afternoon sessions I observed eight removal hearings 
conducted via virtual teleconference from detention centers. 
A typical observation at the South Texas Detention Complex (Pearsall) involved 
coordinating—and meeting if possible—with the immigration attorney in order to prepare for the 
hearing. We were informed by the attorneys we worked with that it was key to arrive 
substantially early for hearings in detention centers, because security had indiscriminate power to 
restrict access to outsiders not affiliated with the case. The prohibition of cell phones in the 
facility made it difficult to contact the immigration attorney if they were already inside when we 
arrived. This made it vital to get the case information beforehand. Providing the detention 
complex security with the case (A) number was required, as well as our purpose for being 
present. Explaining that we were researchers often led to confusion by the security personnel 
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who clearly only wanted a reasonable statement for bureaucratic accountability. They would 
write expert witness or family member on the check-in sheet to expedite the performative 
process of security. Wearing professional attire facilitated the security process, and many times I 
was mistaken for an attorney or law student, and therefore regarded as harmless. Hearings in 
Chicago and San Antonio’s immigration courts were much less difficult to attend and only 
required that the immigration judge, and respondent agree to our presence. To facilitate the 
process, collaborating attorneys would ask permission of their clients beforehand, and sometimes 
the judge as well.  
Attending hearings could prove problematic considering the unpredictable nature of 
scheduling hearings, and often resulted in changed dates or cancellations. This also proved 
difficult in following up with cases whose determinations were postponed or interviewing people 
before and after their hearing. Trying to capture information from courtroom observations was 
extremely difficult since we could not record anything or gain access to transcripts. We relied on 
note taking, and decisions constantly had to be made about whether to document people’s 
reactions, describe physical surroundings, or transcribe the dialogue. Photography, while not 
officially prohibited in certain areas outside the courtroom, was highly suspect by security and 
therefore limited. Some photographs were taken, and sketches were created to capture spatial 
organization of the courtroom.  
Several informal interviews were conducted with five immigration attorneys and two 
immigration judges. The disproportionate power dynamics made formal interviewing of 
immigration judges difficult. When I asked the Chief Immigration Judge in Chicago if I could 
record formal interviews she informed me that it would take a written request of authorization 
from the EOIR, and that I would have to provide my questions for scrutiny. She recommended 
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instead that I wait to speak with judges informally between hearings. These interviews proved 
very useful despite the lack of structure, and judges were comfortable talking candidly about 
their experiences. Attorneys also had no problem expressing the frustrations, and challenges of 
practicing immigration law. Neither group requested anonymity, and court proceedings are 
publicly accessible by law—the exception being asylum hearings which is at the discretion of the 
parties involved. However, I chose to obscure the identities of interviewed attorneys and judges, 
and used pseudonyms for the respondents to prevent any potential backlash. 
The spontaneous and prohibitive nature of courtroom ethnography limited the amount of 
data that could be collected and required note taking as the primary recording method. Although 
courtroom ethnography are prohibitive in that they reduce the ethnographic tools available, 
Hyndman points out that “even when cooperation is forthcoming, what we record is not all that 
took place” (Hyndman, 2010b, p. 264). All the sophisticated recording equipment in existence 
could not capture the totality of each individual’s life or motivations, but these vignettes are a 
valuable tool in the deconstruction of oppressive judgements.  
  
 16 
Chapter 2: Background on Latinos and Immigration Policy 
The following chapter provides a legal-historical background of Latinos in U.S. 
immigration legal spaces. It is meant to provide a geopolitical context explicating the United 
States’ legal reactions to migrants and refugees. This framework is built upon in subsequent 
chapters to expose present geographic inequalities in removal orders, and court proceedings. 
Latinos were selected as the unit of analysis, because combined they have accounted for over 90% 
of removals since 2009 (DHS 2016; DHS 2016). Figure 1 illustrates the configuration of Latino 
removals by country since 2005. 
 
Figure 1: Number of Latinos removed from the United States in comparison to removals of 
all nationalities. Chart adapted from DHS’ Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 
(2016). 
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For the sake of clarity, I define Central America as Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Honduras—recognizing that the term is temporary and amorphous (Sundberg, 2011). In a similar 
vein, Mexico and Central America are referred to as Latin America. It is important to understand 
that while they share similarities, these groups are distinct in their motivations for migrating as 
well as their experiences with legal spaces. Specifically the relatively recent development of 
migrating to escape persecution—instituted by the Convention On Refugees (1951), and the 
Protocol Relating To The Status Of Refugees (1967)—represents another area of divergence for 
Latino experiences that is not fully understood by scholars or politicians.  
Migrants and asylum seekers choose to leave their home  or current residence for a 
variety of reasons: escaping from violence and instability (United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees, 2015), pursuit of a better life and economic situation, participation in a societal 
norm (Popke & Torres, 2013), and many combinations thereof (Hamilton & Chinchilla, 1991; 
Jonas & Rodriguez, 2014; O’Connell Davidson, 2013; Stoll, 2010). The declared reason for 
entering the United States is one of the most important factors when applying for relief from 
deportation. Life circumstances are used to define Latinos and scrutinize them against the legal 
and social framework of “desirable” immigrants. A judge’s existing knowledge and the 
immigration attorney’s presentation of foreign government’s persecutions or impunity, and their 
geographic influence can be instrumental in the outcome of their case. Immigration judges are 
empowered by the REAL ID Act (2005) to use their discretion in determining whether the 
burden of proof has been met based on their perception of the respondent’s credibility. The 
subjectivity of judgement explicitly codified in the act (REAL ID Act, 2005) reveals how similar 
individual cases do not always result in the same outcome (Conroy, 2009). However, background 
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knowledge of Mexican and Central American geopolitics is essential in highlighting these 
instances of arbitrary decision making.  
MEXICO: TWO HUNDRED YEARS AND TWO THOUSAND MILES OF LEGAL SPACE 
The United States and Mexico share a long contentious history steeped in land disputes, 
war, and exploitation. The border between the two nations has evolved over the years from an 
ambiguous imagination to a militarized frontier that exists along California, Arizona, New 
Mexico, and Texas. For the majority of the United States’ first century, the border with Mexico 
was not an issue; immigration concerns were focused towards Europeans and Asians (Stern, 
2004). A borderland was forming in Texas – at the time a part of Mexico – due to Mexican 
efforts to populate the region with Anglos and secure its hold of the territory (Nevins, 2002). 
Cultural and racial differences between Anglos and Mestizos divided the two ethnically (Molina, 
2015), but it was Mexico’s abolition of slavery that started a revolution in 1836 and gained 
Texas its independence. A decade later the United States would annex Texas to become its 48th 
state. Tension between Mexico and its former territory heightened, eventually spurring the 
Mexican American War in 1846, and resulted in the United States’ acquisition of the current 
Western States. The geopolitical border conceptually solidified following the war and clear lines 
demarcating sovereignty were formed. By today’s standards, however, the approximate 2,000 
miles separating the United States and Mexico was hardly enforced.   
For the first hundred years of the United States’ existence, Mexican migration was not a 
concern; The U.S. borders migrated over Mexicans more frequently than the inverse. Labor 
demands during the 18th and 19th century were met through the exploitation of slave labor in the 
U.S. South, and Europeans and Asians working in miserable conditions in Northern cities and on 
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the railroads. The twentieth century would mark the beginning of a new age of regulated 
migration that heavily employed legislation and legal powers as means of enforcement. The 
domain of immigration’s legal space would grow over the next century – and still grows today – 
to encompass a labyrinth of legislation, litigation, and law enforcement aimed at controlling the 
flows of people into and within its jurisdiction. The bilateral Gentleman’s Agreement of 1907 
effectively prevented the emigration of Japanese to the United States and created a labor shortage 
(Legomsky & Rodriguez, 2015, p. 14; Massey, 2016). A series of immigration laws passed from 
1917 to 1924 established country caps – often referred to as quotas, despite setting limits not 
minimums – and barred all Asians from coming to the United States. Border Patrol was also 
founded in 1924, but at that time focused on apprehending Chinese trying to enter the country 
illegally under the new laws (Stern, 2004). Wheatley and Rodriguez (2014) point out that while 
the early Twentieth Century saw an increase in legislation limiting the amount and types of 
people permitted to enter the United States, Mexicans were largely unaffected by this 
legislation. Mexicans began emerging as an abundant labor force due to an increase in 
exclusionary legislation for Asians and Europeans, and their close proximity to the border made 
it easy to regulate movement. 
The Great Depression and subsequent decade sparked the beginning of a popular anti-
immigrant discourse that would result in the forceful decrease in Mexican labor. The rhetoric 
revolved around a narrative that Mexicans were stealing citizen’s jobs and playing off of 
economic insecurities. Scholars calculate that over 400,000 Mexicans were deported between 
1929 and 1937, resulting in the Mexican population of the United States diminishing by half 
from 1930 and 1940 (Massey, 2016; Wheatley & Rodriguez, 2014). Mexican immigration would 
not increase again until the Second World War when labor deficits forced the United States to 
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reshape the boundaries of immigration legal spaces. Bilateral negotiations with Mexico in 1942 
created the Bracero Program which lasted until 1964. Agro-business and the U.S. government 
largely ignored provisions set in place in the agreement to protect workers and subjected 
Braceros to poor living and working conditions. Documented abuses included: “poor food, 
excessive charges for board, substandard housing, discrimination, physical mistreatment, 
inappropriate deductions from their wages, and exposure to pesticides and other dangerous 
chemicals” (Carrasco, 1998, p. 81). The Bracero Program allowed hundreds of thousands of 
Mexicans to work in the United States, but it also codified Mexicans as a rotating and 
expendable labor force. This ideology of visitors traversing the geopolitical space further 
alienated them. Many believed that temporary workers would prevent immigration, but scholars 
(Dunn, 2009; Massey et al., 2016; Nevins, 2002) point out that the opposite occurred due to the 
hiring processes of agricultural employers and the exploitability of unauthorized workers.  
The pattern of authorized temporary migration and unauthorized labor exploitation 
continued to grow the Mexican population within the United States until a recession following 
the Korean War (Legomsky & Rodriguez, 2015; Wheatley & Rodriguez, 2014), and fears from 
communist infiltration (Massey, 2016; Nevins, 2002) spurred the Eisenhower administration to 
take action. In the summer of 1954, a second mass deportation effort known as Operation 
Wetback occurred. By the end of fiscal year 1954, nearly a million Mexicans had been deported 
from U.S. territory, with another million being apprehended. While the political campaign was 
praised by anti-immigration supporters, scholars (Jonas & Rodriguez, 2014; Massey, 2016; 
Wheatley & Rodriguez, 2014) point out that the operation’s efficacy alone is misleading. 
Deportation numbers had been growing exponentially since 1944 and exceeded half a million 
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each year starting from 1950 (figure 2). The cumulative enforcement efforts of the decade prior 
to 1954 far exceeded those during the operation. 
 
Figure 2: History of total apprehensions, returns and removals by U.S. border enforcement. 
Chart adapted from INS and DHS’ Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (2016; U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1997). 
To offset the pressure from agribusiness, which had grown accustomed to cheap 
exploitable labor, the Eisenhower administration used its executive powers to increase the 
number of temporary workers by 378,000 from 1950 to 1956 (Massey, 2016). The root of 
Operation Wetback, and others like it, derives from a process that is continuously repeated in 
immigration legal space. Economic uncertainty and national insecurity are used to stoke anti-
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immigrant sentiment by media outlets and politicians campaigning in their own self-interests 
(Coleman, 2012a; Hernandez-Truyol, 1998; Trump, 2015).  
Legislation amidst the civil rights era further problematized immigration for Mexicans. 
The 1965 amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act (1965) eliminated country bans 
and replaced them with a global visa cap of 290,000, limiting each nation to 20,000 visas. No 
exception was made for the western hemisphere – previously spared regulation – and in the 
process eliminating nearly 500,000 visas for Mexican migrants (Massey, 2016; Wheatley & 
Rodriguez, 2014). However, the 200,000 plus migrants from Mexico did not stop entering the 
United States, they merely became unauthorized. The stroke of a pen did little to stop the 
movement of individuals, but it did transform the identities of a whole class of people from 
human to alien. The Bracero program – which was allowed to expire in 1964 – had also caused a 
change in the demographics of Mexican immigrants as the relative stability of the system 
allowed an increasing number to bring their families – legally or not. Therefore, it was not just 
adult males who were becoming criminalized, but whole families as well. Labor demands still 
existed and without any real form of punishing or regulating employers, Mexicans continued to 
migrate at existing numbers. Massey (2016, p. 168) notes that between 1965 and 1980 migration 
patterns remained largely unchanged. Consequently, a century of circular migration has 
established the impression that Mexicans are only economic migrants and unworthy of relief.  
The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, on the surface did well by 
many unauthorized immigrants, but masked increased funding for securitization. IRCA (1986) 
provided a small window for those residing illegally in the United States prior to 1982 to make 
an adjustment of status—commonly referred to as amnesty. It made hiring unauthorized labor a 
criminal offense; substantially increased Border Patrol’s budget, and established a temporary 
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worker program. The program eventually led to the legalization of almost 2.7 million people 
(Legomsky & Rodriguez, 2015). IRCA (1986), and most of the subsequent immigration laws, 
are a double edged sword which tout their inclusionary components to further strengthen border 
and immigration enforcement. The 1990s saw an increase in anti-immigration and Latino 
sentiments. California’s prop 187 required doctors, teachers, and other social services to report 
individuals out of legal status. The Supreme Court eventually held that states did not have the 
authority to pass laws enforcing immigration matters, however, the equally damning Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) would pass a few 
years later. 
During this time period the Border Patrol, and enforcement in general, militarized the 
border and conducted various operations that oppressed citizens and terrorized those out of legal 
status. Militarized enforcement operations along the southern border resulted in an increase in 
removals (figure 2), deaths (Eschbach, Hagan, Rodriguez, Hernandez-Leon, & Bailey, 1999), 
and violations of both civil and human rights (Dunn, 2009; Nevins, 2002). The securitization had 
been occurring for nearly three decades before the attacks on September 11th, 2001, but the years 
following that tragedy would petrify the nation in fear and created an absolute belief in securing 
the border at any cost. The Secure Fence Act (2006) authorized the construction of 700 miles of 
border fence and other technological surveillance systems (Gonzales, 2013). Additionally, 
funding for Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has doubled from $5.9 billion in 2003 to 11.9 
billion in 2013 (Blau & Mackie, 2016). Furthermore, a component of the REAL ID act  (2005) 
greatly restricted Latino mobility by heightening the standards for securing identification (Price, 
2015). At current rates, the United States removes about half a million people every year (DHS 
2016). Mexicans still make up the majority of people trapped within immigration legal spaces, 
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but the population of Unauthorized Mexicans living in the United States is steadily declining 
corresponding to the 2007 recession (Pew Research Center, 2016). Simultaneously the number of 
Central Americans immigrating or seeking asylum, especially women and children, continues to 
rise. 
CENTRAL AMERICANS AND THE FRUITS OF THEIR LABOR  
A great deal of attention has been paid to Mexico and its relationship with the United 
States in large part because of its shared geographic and political history. Additionally, the 
Mexican experience with the immigration legal space is not only similar to that of Guatemalans, 
El Salvadorians, and Hondurans it is a metaphorical and physical funnel for their experience. 
Given that Central Americans pass through Mexico’s territory and converge on the U.S. southern 
border, they are perceived as a homogenous ethnic group in many respects. In the United States 
identity and heritage are conflated to create one racialized group responsible for a weakened 
economy (Hernandez-Truyol, 1998), crime (Dunn, 2009; Gonzales, 2013), and ethnic pollution 
(Molina, 2015; Stern, 2004). Although popular and political discourse aggregates all four groups, 
their contact with the immigration system and geopolitical history with the United States differ in 
various aspects. Central Americans are an important component to this research, because of 
their focus in the media and the resulting xenophobic and nationalist response. 
Central America’s political relationship with the United States over the last century has 
consisted of U.S. economic exploitation of natural resources, and a proxy control by supporting 
despots favorable to its interests (Dym & Offen, 2011; Garni & Weyher, 2013; Hamilton & 
Chinchilla, 1991; Schoonover, 1989). Western fruit companies established plantations 
throughout the Americas and Caribbean, however, the United Fruit Company would eventually 
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gain a monopoly in the region. Their involvement, however, brought much instability as well. 
The vulnerability of mono-cropping bananas resulted in the creation and destruction of 
plantations due to disease. Workers were left unemployed and disenfranchised once a growing 
region became contaminated and abandoned (Bucheli, 2008). The actions of the United Fruit 
Company set the precedent for U.S. economic domination and political control in the Northern 
Triangle – as well as other parts of Central America and the Caribbean.   
Capitalist exploitation and U.S. political intervention—with roots in policies such as the 
Monroe Doctrine—and its legacy built resentment among Central Americans who had been 
displaced and later abandoned by their capitalist friendly governments. Socialist ideologies 
began to circulate in the region during the twentieth century that stoked the United States’ fear of 
communist regimes emerging near its borders. As was common in the Cold War the United 
States resorted to building proxy armies in foreign states to fight communism or groups 
purporting socialist ideals. The United States also did not hesitate to send its military for support 
or direct action and to ensure economic interests (Bucheli, 2008). Civil wars erupted throughout 
the region resulting in mass murder if not genocide; the effects of the war persist today and are 
key precursors to the instability in the region (Norma Stoltz Chinchilla & Hamilton, 2000; 
Schoonover, 1989). The conflicts initially prevented many people from migrating to the United 
States, but later served as a stimulus for leaving political and economic instability. These 
migration patterns changed at a time when immigration laws were becoming more draconian and 
the southern border more militarized. The migrations also had a reciprocal effect and the United 
States’ legal space would start to creep into the region in the guise of dismantling organized 
crime, and suppressing insurgency.  
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Circular migration into Mexico for agricultural work had been fairly common in 
Guatemala, but it was not until the 1960s that significant migration to the United States began 
(Castles et al., 2014) in response to the economic and geopolitical climate. Guatemala enjoyed a 
ten year period (1944-1954) of democratically elected presidents—Juan José Arévalo and Jacobo 
Arbenz Guzmán.—who initiated several reforms reincorporating Maya and women and other 
policies aimed at equality. The United States’ CIA overthrew the governments in fear of 
communist expansion, and nationalism (Levenson-Estrada, 2014) and subsequently maintained 
cruel and oppressive regimes. Jonas and Rodriguez (2014) explain that from 1966-1968 the 
United States directly oversaw the Guatemalan government’s military campaign against the 
leftist Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes, who opportunistically associated peasant groups fighting for 
land rights as sympathizers.  
The following three decades – until peace accords were signed in 1996 – continue to be 
ruled by militarized governments who maintained control through brutal oppression. Death 
squads sympathetic to landowners known as the “Mana Blanca” were imbedded in rural villages 
throughout Guatemala and served as assassins (Morrison & May, 1994); US trained death squads 
“disappeared” opposition leaders (Levenson-Estrada, 2014). Most atrociously, the scorched earth 
policy of Efraín Ríos Montt resulted in a brutal genocide of indigenous Guatemalans (N. S. 
Chinchilla, 1999). It is estimated that up to 150,000 people were massacred during this violent 
time (Jonas & Rodriguez, 2014). Guatemalans began migrating to the United States in a time of 
heightened security—perceived by many in the United States as communist threat—and growing 
anti-immigrant legislation (Jonas & Rodriguez, 2014).  
During the 1970s and 1980s there were few grants of asylum for Guatemalans despite the 
escalating violence. Jonas and Rodriguez (2014) posit that congress would have terminated 
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funding for the Reagan administration’s counter insurgency operations had there been 
documented incidences of human rights violations in Guatemala. However, much of the 
intervention had been conducted through covert CIA operations. During this period the 
Guatemalan population in the United States jumped from approximately 17,000 documented in 
the 1970’s census (Hamilton & Chinchilla, 1991; Jonas & Rodriguez, 2014) to 1.3 million 
estimated by the Pew Research Center in 2013 (Lopez, 2015).   
Recent Guatemalans seeking to enter the United States are different than their traditional 
demographics (Castles et al., 2014); in 2014 an unprecedented number of women and children, a 
large percentage being Guatemalan, presented themselves to U.S. border authorities in search of 
legal relief. Border authorities involved in the event explained to me that these families had 
heard rumors that asylum was being granted if you presented yourself to a Border Patrol agent. 
Many of these families fled abysmal conditions and had been victims of physical and sexual 
abuse, in addition to impoverished conditions (Amnesty International, 2016; Torzilli et al., 2014; 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2015).  
Second to Mexico, El Salvador has received the most attention in politics and the media, 
because of its geopolitical ties to the United States and gangs. There is a history of United States 
involvement in El Salvador’s violence and militarization that persists even today. Migration from 
El Salvador was sparse until the 1970s and largely motivated by conflict. As a result nearly a 
million people were displaced throughout North America (Chávez, 2015), including 
communities in Washington D.C. and Los Angeles. Civil war erupted in El Salvador in 1979 
when the Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación (FMLN) staged a coup against the reigning 
government. The civil war lasted until 1992 when the UN helped broker a truce, however by then 
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75,000 civilians and thousands of combatants had been killed – nearly 2% of the remaining 
population of a country of 4 million (Chávez, 2015).  
War still rages in El Salvador despite the peace treaty signed in 1992; it is not a civil war 
in the traditional sense, but a U.S. endorsed war on drugs, crime, and gangs (Gonzales, 2013; 
Swanson & Torres, 2016). The Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) street gang formed in response to 
violence from the predominant Latino street gang known as the Mexican Mafia. In 1993 an 
alliance was formed between the two gangs and the number 13—representing the 13th letter of 
the alphabet (M)—was appended marking, their affiliation with the Mexican Mafia (Adams & 
Pizarro, 2009). The militarization of the U.S. border and in a sense legal space in the 1990s 
resulted in a massive uptick in deportations, especially of MS-13 members. Repatriation resulted 
in increased recruitment and the formation of other gangs, solidifying the transnational criminal 
organizations that exist today. The United States invested heavily into El Salvador’s military and 
law enforcement in response to the cyclical gang nexus. Gonzales (2013, p. 103) describes how 
“military and police aid to El Salvador rose from $707,000 in 1996 to $18,646,533 in 2006, at 
the height of the war on gangs under the ARENA government.” However, sympathy towards 
civil war conditions in Central America also affected immigration legal spaces slightly in favor 
of Salvadorians and Guatemalans with the passing of Nicaraguan and Central American Relief 
Act (NACARA) in 1997—granting some stays of deportation (Norma Stoltz Chinchilla & 
Hamilton, 2000). 
Honduras shares the similar past with El Salvador and Guatemala; another banana 
republic with U.S. backed dictators friendly towards neoliberal policies at the expense of its 
citizens. Small numbers of Hondurans migrated to port cities like New Orleans in the early 
twentieth century as a result of the banana trade (Hamilton & Chinchilla, 1991). Honduras in 
 29 
some ways fared better than its neighbors, because it did not suffer bloody civil wars. Several 
coups occurred in tandem with other Central American nations that suppressed economic and 
political stability (Salomon, 2016), however genocide and mass killings were avoided. This may 
partially explain why Hondurans were not included in NACARA (1997). Relative stability in 
Honduras made migration from El Salvador to the agricultural fringes of Honduras common. It is 
estimated that some 300,000 Salvadorians had migrated to Honduras by the 1960s (Hamilton & 
Chinchilla, 1991), although the trend would change in 1969 when war broke out between the two 
nations. Relative political stability as of 1980 was disrupted again in 2009 when a militarized 
government took control, and implemented aggressive and violent tactics to combat crime and 
the poor (Salomon, 2016). 
Honduras’ role in North American trade extends beyond agriculture and is an important 
node in the illicit transportation of drugs, weapons, and contraband. Honduras is an important 
transfer location between Colombian drug producers and Mexican cartel traffickers (InSight 
Crime, 2016). The mass deportation of gang member during the 1990s affected Honduras in the 
same way as El Salvador and has led to high levels of violence and instability. Furthermore, 
Honduras underwent the same economic reconstruction as the other Central American states, 
which has left it with an equally dismal economy and contributes to widespread violence.  
While the reasons for migration from Latin America are complex, the United States 
political and popular sentiment have homogenized everyone’s experience as poor workers trying 
to monopolize on the “American Dream.” The concept of a legal and “right” way to immigrate to 
the United States has been ingrained in the U.S. psyche despite the many years where this 
complex legal mechanism restricting the movement of people was absent. This argument is 
familiar given the repeated use of legislation to block immigrants like the Chinese Exclusion 
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Act, Barred Zone Act, and the Johnson-Reed Act (Legomsky & Rodriguez, 2015). However the 
association with unauthorized entrance and criminality is a relatively new and insidious 
development that masks a new form of segregation based on legal status (Abrego, 2015). 
Citizenship has also been affixed to race in a way that makes where one is born on par with who 
one is born to in terms of establishing social stratification.  
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Chapter 3: Defining Immigration Legal Spaces 
Conceptual uses of space and law are used differently and with little consensus within 
legal geography (Delaney, 2014). However, legal studies share an emphasis with feminist 
geography in regards to social justice, recognition of the embodied nature of law, and the social 
construction of space (Braverman et al., 2014; Delaney, 2015). I define legal spaces as those 
spatial-temporal organizations of society, and their resistance, through the use of law and 
enforcement. These processes manifest in physical enforcement and apprehension, corporeal 
punishment, and courtrooms of judgement. I distinguish immigration legal spaces when legal 
status and citizenship becomes the foci. Furthermore, these legal spaces are not isolated and 
often overlap and contradict—such as between federal and local law enforcement or state and 
federal courts. 
In application, legal spaces traverse many different social scales; they are defined by the 
congressional members who draft immigration law, the president responsible for executing it, the 
border patrol agent “on the line” enforcing policy, and the many people litigating inside of 
courtrooms. The complexity and obfuscation of immigration and refugee law warrants a 
summarization in order to understand Latino encounters in legal spaces. The United States 
immigration system is the product of over two centuries of legal development. However, in the 
last thirty years it has become especially complex to veil its xenophobic and oppressive political 
agenda (Abrego, 2015; Coleman, 2012a; Gonzales, 2013). 
On a macro scale, legal space is visible in the roles and conflicts between the three 
branches of government (figure 3). The embattled checks and balances are integral in the 
continual reformation of legal space’s authority, jurisdiction, and control over the body. 
Constitutionally, and through centuries of litigation, immigration responsibilities of have fallen 
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under the jurisdiction of the federal government. In theory this centralizes immigration law and 
policy under one governmental order, assuring equal enforcement throughout the United States; 
in practice, regional politics are critical in how policy is executed. The following sections will 
review each branch’s function in creating immigration legal spaces and further explain the 
process of navigating legal immigration and relief from deportation.  
 
Figure 3: Each branch of the U.S. government’s responsbilities in the formation of 
immigration legal spaces.  
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The legislature has drafted many immigration bills, but the original INA (1965), drafted 
in 1952, codified disparate immigration statutes under one law. Over time this law has been 
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rights that exist today (Coleman & Kocher, 2011; Legomsky & Rodriguez, 2015; Menjívar & 
Abrego, 2012). IIRIRA (1996) was the cardinal amendment responsible for the draconian laws 
and policy governing immigration and asylum today.  
IIRIRA (1996)  introduced 28 new aggravated felonies justifying deportation, many of 
which were previously considered minor and included some misdemeanors (Menjívar & Abrego, 
2012; Wheatley, 2011). Additionally, offenses subject to removal became retroactive and 
affected anyone with a criminal record, regardless of whether they had completed their sentence. 
IIRIRA (1996) increased the speed and “efficiency” of removals by not only manufacturing 
aggravated felonies, but also enhancing the legal mechanisms available to facilitate their 
execution.  
This legislation also introduced expedited removals (IIRIRA, 1996) that surpasses a 
hearing if an immigration officer at a port of entry determines the use of fraudulent or improper 
documentation. Expedited removals empower the immigration officer as the gatekeeper to due 
process and judicial intervention. This gatekeeper determines what is fraudulent and improper, or 
who deserves a credible fear interview due to fear of persecution, the main criteria for being 
granted asylum. The first door opens to a swift deportation barring re-entry for five years, or a 
lifetime ban if citizenship was falsely claimed; the second initiates an arduous path towards 
gaining asylum and full legal status. Nearly half of removals from 2014 to 2016 have been 
charges of “Immigrant’s not in possession of valid entry documents,” and “alien[s] present in 
U.S. who [were] not admitted or paroled” (TRAC, n.d.)—44%, 48%, and 43% respectively.  
IIRIRA (1996) also made changes to the terminology in the INA (1965) pertaining to 
deportation that had substantial impact reconfiguring immigration legal space. Prior to 1996, 
exclusion and deportability were distinct categories; the first prevented an adjustment of status to 
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becoming a legal permanent resident, but did not necessarily result in deportation, whereas the 
second did. This distinction was eliminated in IIRIRA (1996) with the creation of removals, and 
made anyone illegally—now a much broader definition—within the United States vulnerable to 
removal (Legomsky & Rodriguez, 2015).  
Congress also vastly increased enforcement powers to ensure the increased orders of 
removal could be fully exploited. IIRIRA (1996) allows local and state law enforcement to 
“perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or 
detention of aliens in the United States“ (8 U.S.C. §1357, 1996) with permission by the Attorney 
general. This clause has the power to deputize non-federal law enforcement with unprecedented 
authority reversing years of litigation maintaining federal control over immigration enforcement. 
The expansion of immigration enforcement through IIRIRA’s (1996) section 287(g) has resulted 
in racial profiling and the targeting of Latino communities by local law enforcement (Gonzales, 
2013; Menjívar & Abrego, 2012; Varsanyi, 2008). The criminalization of all unauthorized 
people in the United States, and the extension of enforcement powers, vastly increased the 
number of people subject to removal.  
EXECUTIVE BRANCH: IMMIGRATION JUDGE, JUROR, AND DEPORTER 
The executive branch is responsible for enacting the laws created by congress, but the 
INA (1965) has bestowed it with uncharacteristic judicial responsibilities. Immigration courts, 
unlike other courts, are not under the control of the judicial branch, but subordinate to the 
Department of Justice and the president. Many scholars (Legomsky & Rodriguez, 2015; Ramji-
Nogales, Schoenholtz, & Schrag, 2009) have called attention to the conflict of interest placing 
the immigration courts—responsible for determining legal status—subordinate to those 
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responsible for their removal. This manifests in several ways: The attorney general—appointed 
by the president and chief law enforcement officer—is responsible for hiring, firing, and 
determining the number of immigration judges and Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
members. The latter duty is particularly influential, because the BIA is responsible for hearing 
challenges to immigration judge’s rulings and thereby capable of creating case law. These 
landmark decisions set precedence for future interpretation of the INA (1965) and constitute a 
body of law on par with legislation (Legomsky & Rodriguez, 2015).  
At the highest level, the President is responsible for setting the number of refugees that 
may be admitted and the geographic distribution of those visas. They can also create executive 
orders directly influencing outcomes for immigrants and asylum seekers. Executive Orders are 
the mechanism by which the president prioritizes enforcement and removals. They can also be 
used to ban groups from entering the United States entirely. The executive branch is also 
responsible for laws and border enforcement that has profound impact on Latino’s interactions 
with borders and immigration courtrooms. 
The executive branch’s role in shaping the contours of immigration legal space are 
profound for Latinos. Subordinate to the president and with tremendous influence on 
immigration legal space is the Attorney General, who serves as chief law enforcement officer. In 
the 1990s Attorney General John Ashcroft fully utilized his authority to implement sweeping 
changes that staggered the judicial review process: the BIA was reduced from 23 to 11 members, 
he removed five members who disagreed with him ideologically, required that 50,000 cases be 
resolved within six months, and relaxed the diligence required by the BIA to issue decisions 
(Ramji-Nogales et al., 2009). His Successor Attorney General Alberto Gonzales further 
politicized the immigration legal spaces when his office hired judges based on political 
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affiliation. A Washington Times (Goldstein & Eggen, 2007) investigation exposed that “At least 
one-third of the immigration judges appointed by the Justice Department since 2004 have had 
Republican connections or have been administration insiders, and half lacked experience in 
immigration law.” The Washington Times’ revelations are supported by the analysis of legal 
scholars (Legomsky & Rodriguez, 2015; Ramji-Nogales et al., 2009), and Senior Counsel 
Monica Goodling’s testimony before a House Judiciary Committee (The Washington Post, 
2007). In her testimony, Monica Goodling admitted that “I may have gone too far in asking 
political questions of applicants for career positions, and I may have taken inappropriate 
considerations to account on some occasions.”  
FEDERAL COURTS: BRANCHING OUT OF IMMIGRATION LEGAL SPACE 
Ironically, the judicial branch’s role in determining legal status for immigrants and 
refugees has been significantly impeded by the INA (1965). The judiciary retains its power to 
contain legislative and executive actions on constitutional and legal grounds, but otherwise has 
been removed from the daily administration of immigration and asylum duties. Upon an appeal 
to the federal circuit courts, migrants and asylum seekers enter the immigration legal spaces of 
the federal judicial branch. These federal courts have unique properties that separate them from 
the lower levels of immigration courts; for one, they follow clear geographic boundaries based 
on states, and second they fall under the authority of the Judicial Branch, and therefore transcend 
executive oversight. These higher courts are highly politicized as well (Ramji-Nogales et al., 
2009); the EOIR (2016b) reports that two liberal circuits, the 7th and 9th, have nearly double the 
reversal rates of conservative circuits in regards to immigration decisions. Therefore asylum 
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seekers often have to navigate various scales of legal and geographic hurdles – none of which 
align with each other or constitutional due process. 
The INA (1965) prevents the circuit courts from reviewing new evidence and must make 
their determination on the information presented in the original case. Furthermore, federal courts 
cannot—except in rare situations—grant asylum; they can only send the case back to the BIA for 
review. In very rare instances, cases are elevated to the Supreme Court for a determination. 
These cases are only accepted if the court feels it is necessary to address on a larger societal 
basis. Their decision usually arrives too late to be of practical use to an individual, however the 
court holds the ultimate power in determining how the law is interpreted for subsequent case 
thereafter. All three of these branches are integral to the creation of immigration legal space and 
how that impacts Latinos.  
SHAPING CITIZENSHIP: OBSTACLES FOR LEGAL IMMIGRATION 
 Entering the United States legally can be accomplished either by gaining a visitor or 
immigrant visa. The former is for temporary purposes such as vacations or to study; the second 
class of visas are for those seeking to enter the United States as legal permanent residence 
(LPR). Citizenship can only be attained after several requirements have been met: LPR for five 
years, comprehension of the English language (reading, writing, speaking), passed a civics and 
U.S. history test, and “be a person of good moral character, demonstrate[ing] an attachment to 
the principles and ideals of the U.S. Constitution” (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
n.d.). Needless to say, meeting these requirements can be very difficult and are far from 
guaranteed. 
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 The combination of categorical preferences and geographic limitations are used to create 
a complex space that makes legally migrating to the United States difficult for some, and 
impossible for others. There are three categories of immigrant visas: family sponsored, employee 
based, and diversity immigrants. All three categories have various subcategories, each ranked by 
their preference. The number of immigrants admissible each year is not a static `, but a 
cumbersome equation that ranks individuals based on their skill and nationality. The formulas 
used to determine the visa limitations, or “quotas”, are provided in table 1.  
Preference Type Numerical Formula 
Family Sponsored 
480,000 – (children of LPR’s born abroad + immediate 
relatives of U.S. citizens admitted the previous fiscal 
year) + unused employment based visas 
Employment Based 140,000 + number of unused family visas the previous fiscal year 
Diversity 55,000 
Table 1: Equation used to determine the number of immigration visas granted to each 
category in any given year. Adapted from the INA (1965). 
The United States has geographic restrictions in addition to the stringent numeric and 
categorical requirements. Each officially recognized foreign state may receive no more than 
seven percent of issued visas. There are exceptions to the country limit, but the most utilized is 
reserved for direct relatives of U.S. citizens—totaling 465,068 visas in fiscal year 2015. Despite 
this large number, the list of qualifying direct family members is quite narrow in scope: spouses, 
unmarried children under 21, orphans adopted abroad, orphans to be adopted in the United States 
by a U.S. citizen, or parents of U.S. citizens (U.S. State Department, 2017). For many Latinos 
with unprofessional skills the country quotas are backfilled for years, and in some cases decades 
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(Legomsky & Rodriguez, 2015; United States Department of State, 2016). Those with an urgent 
need to immigrate have little legal recourse to do so.  
In the case of those fleeing persecution based on “race, religion, nationality, or 
membership in a particular social group” (8 U.S.C. § 1158) there is potential for gaining asylum 
and legal status in the United States. It is important to note that extreme poverty—even if 
imposed by the state—does not qualify. The terms refugee and asylum are often used 
interchangeably in popular media, however, their official distinction is important in 
understanding how legal spaces are shaped. A refugee is someone who has successfully passed 
the legal gauntlet and gained asylum in one of two ways. Affirmative asylum is applied for from 
the country of origin, involves years of paperwork, and extensive background checks (United 
States Citizenship and Immigration Services, n.d.). In contrast, defensive asylum can be gained 
by two methods. The first approach is petitioned once an individual is in removal proceedings, 
either in detention or free on bond. The second form occurs when someone expresses a fear of 
persecution at a port of entry. Granted that an immigration officer in the latter scenario believes 
the person’s fear of persecution, an asylum officer is then entrusted to determine the validity of 
the claim through a credible fear interview; those seeking relief who have already been deported 
must undergo a reasonable fear interview that has a much higher level of scrutiny. In time, and 
highly variable due to the backlog of cases, an immigration judge will make a determination at a 
merits hearing whether to grant asylum, another form of relief, or maintain the removal order. 
Although, section 235 of the INA (1965) implies detention even when credible fear is 
valid, legal scholars have noted that parole is often used to waive detention. Recently this 
practice has shifted due to the political climate and regional politics. In 2010 there were 15,769 
people held in detention, this number increased to 44,270 in 2014 (Human Rights First, 2016). 
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Moreover, detention rates vary wildly based on geography (Legomsky & Rodriguez, 2015); 
Texas accounts for 45% of all detentions (Human Rights First, 2016). Immigration legal spaces 
have created a catch-22 for those attempting to secure asylum in the United States. To gain 
affirmative asylum, which is the preferred method, individuals and families must remain in 
dangerous circumstances for an average of two years with no guarantee of being granted asylum. 
The alternative is to subject oneself to apprehension, possible detention, and face higher 
standards for gaining defensive asylum, also with no guarantee.  
FINDING RELIEF 
There are several forms of relief from removal available to some outside of legal status. 
They can be pursued once a person is apprehended, issued a notice to appear, and placed in 
removal proceedings. The most common forms of relief other than asylum include: appealing 
under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, and 
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS). Requirements, Legal protection, and their afforded 
rights vary between these different categories.  
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment is similar to asylum, but is based on a fear of torture. It was adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1984 and prevents any participant from returning an individual to a 
country where they fear being tortured. Although it is a signatory, the United States did not 
accept the convention on its face, but ratified the CAT to be more narrow (Legomsky & 
Rodriguez, 2015). Regardless of this fact it is still often used in conjunction with asylum 
applications during removal hearings since many of the requirements overlap. Both Asylum and 
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CAT prevent the applicant from ever returning to their country without permanently losing legal 
status in the United States, even after gaining citizenship. 
Cancellation of removals are one of the most desirable forms of relief, because they 
adjust the status of the individual to that of an LPR. This form of relief is available in two ways: 
LPRs in removal proceedings are able to seek cancellation of removal if they have not been 
convicted of an aggravated felony, been admitted legally for five years, and have been present in 
the United States for seven consecutive years. People out of legal status must have no criminal 
history, have been present in the United States for 10 consecutive years, and demonstrate good 
moral character. Non-LPRs are also required to “establish that removal would result in 
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien's spouse, parent, or child, who is a 
citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence” (8 U.S.C. 
§1229a). 
Voluntary departure allows the person subject to removal to leave the country on their 
own expense without a formal removal order, so long as they are not being charged with an 
aggravated felony or on national security grounds. The benefit to voluntary departure is that it 
does not bar the person from re-entering the United States at a later date, which a formal 
deportation would. Short time periods ranging from 60 to 120 days are given to leave the United 
States and the consequences for not leaving are harsher than a deportation. In reality those who 
are subject to voluntary departure do not likely have recourse for obtaining a visa prior to 
removal or at a later date. 
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Chapter 4: Legal Consequences of a Securitized State for Latino Migrants 
and Asylum Seekers 
The United States has a history of hyper nationalism, where sovereignty and the 
preservation of territorial borders are of prime concern (Massey, 2016; Stern, 2004). State 
sovereignty is a common ideation in modern geopolitics, but borders and citizenship are more 
nuanced in definition. In particular after 9/11, but even as early as the Cold War, the United 
States has placed increasing emphasis on the physical bordering of its territory and the legal 
bordering of its citizens (Menjívar & Abrego, 2012). Both are targeted at restricting and 
monitoring the mobility of people through its space, in particular Latinos. Geopolitical 
securitization founded on nationalist ideals has resulted in the modern security state. 
Consequentially the United States’ territorial boundary and legal framework have been distorted 
in attempts to orchestrate the mobility and behavior of Latinos (Gonzales, 2013; Menjívar & 
Abrego, 2012)—and other groups—with violent affect. The following chapter traces the 
contours of modern U.S. sovereignty through immigration legal space’s contortion of its territory 
at the expense of many Latinos.  
The United States’ ability to assert its sovereignty at any cost is a common theme in 
modern geopolitics; in the legal spaces of courtrooms and legislative bodies I observe that this is 
referred to as the “rule of law.” However, I posit that this sanctification of law is a merely a 
façade for oppressive legislation and enforcement. The assertion of sovereignty is also present in 
mundane actions, such as those expressed by strangers who learn of my graduate work: The car 
salesman who tells me his immigrant German wife hates those who come here illegally, because 
she had to do it the right way—entirely ignorant of the fact that many do not have the 
opportunity to marry a white U.S. citizen. There are also those close acquaintances of mine—
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some of which are Mexican citizens—who tell me they support Latino immigrants, but “que le 
da rabia a los que comiten crimen” (criminal immigrants enrage her) and, “Good! They should 
deport criminals, even for DUIs.” These experiences stem from the idea that there is a 
geopolitical entity that needs protection from those who would violate its territoriality and 
pollute what they “fought hard” to enjoy. These private encounter are more than off hand 
remarks made in confidence, they are paramount for the construction of sovereignty (Dowler, 
2012). 
The United States and Mexico border is presented as “broken” because it cannot prevent 
the undocumented migration that occurs from Latin America. Those who pass through the 
boundary are thought of as “illegal” bodies which defy the sovereignty of the state. In the lead up 
to the anti-immigration legislation IIRIRA (1996), President Clinton issued a memorandum 
emphasizing the importance of sovereignty:  
It is a fundamental right and duty for a nation to protect the integrity of its borders 
and its laws. This Administration shall stand firm against illegal immigration and the 
continued abuse of our immigration laws. By closing the back door to illegal 
immigration, we will continue to open the front door to legal immigration. My 
Administration has moved swiftly to reverse the course of a decade of failed immigration 
policies. Our initiatives have included increasing overall Border personnel by over 50 
percent since 1993. We also are strengthening worksite enforcement and work 
authorization verification to deter employment of illegal aliens. Asylum rules have been 
reformed to end abuse by those falsely claiming asylum, while offering protection to 
those in genuine fear of persecution. We are cracking down on smugglers of illegal aliens 
and reforming criminal alien deportation for quicker removal. And we are the first 
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Administration to obtain funding to reimburse States for a share of the costs of 
incarcerating criminal illegal aliens (Clinton, 1995). 
What is important to note in Clinton’s speech is the conflation of sovereignty, security, and the 
need to secure the borders from criminal foreign bodies. This speech was a prelude to the 
draconian immigration policies that criminalized and deported millions over the next several 
decades.  
CRIMINALIZING LATINO MIGRANTS AND ASYLUM SEEKERS 
United States’ immigration policy restricts mobility, limits or eliminates legal rights, 
defers protection from exploitation, and denies fundamental resources. Nationalist legislation 
like IIRIRA (1996) has created an underclass based on citizenship (Menjívar & Abrego, 2012). 
In the last forty years this class of “aliens” have not only been de-humanized, but also 
criminalized. Nationalism has spurred the creation of legislation like IIRIRA (1996) that reifies 
citizenship as an inherent value metric used to judge Latinos on par with race and class 
(Bloemraad, Korteweg, & Yurdakul, 2008; Gonzales, 2013; Menjívar & Abrego, 2012). 
Appealing to everyone’s inherent need of safety makes the political agenda acceptable to all 
despite the countless non-criminals who are swept along with securitization and migration 
control (Gonzales, 2013). As a result of IIRIRA (1996) many Latinos are placed in a state of 
illegality for merely existing within the geopolitical territory of the state. Data (TRAC, n.d.) 
presented in table 2 reveals that a large percentage of Latinos who are deported do not have a 
prior criminal record, or their only crime was being present without authorization. 
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Most Serious Crime Convicted MX GT SV HN 
Illegal Entry  17% 10% 9% 12% 
Illegal Re-Entry 5% 2% 1% 3% 
No Conviction 28% 68% 67% 57% 
Total 51% 80% 77% 71% 
Table 2: Proportion of deportation of Mexicans (MX), Guatemalans (GT), Salvadorians 
(SV), and Hondurans (HN) with no criminal record or illegal presence as their most 
serious crime ever committed. Table created from TRAC  (n.d.). 
A great deal of posturing and effort has gone into defending the nation-state security 
model which manifests in the colossal funding for border formation and its security. The budget 
for Border Patrol and enforcement continues to rise; according to the CBP  website, the number 
of Border Patrol (USBP) agents has grown from nearly 6,000 agents in 1996 to the current 
staffing of almost 20,000—excluding the many ICE agents who are responsible for apprehending 
unauthorized people already in the United States (USBP 2016b). The sad irony in the perpetual 
securitization of the United States is that it comes at a time when Latino migration is in fact 
decreasing (Blau & Mackie, 2016).  The number of Mexican apprehensions—which comprise 
the overwhelming majority—have been steadily declining over the last decade (figure 4). In 
contrast Central Americans have increased to almost equal numbers.  
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Figure 4: Number of Latinos apprehended in comparison to apprehensions of all nationalities 
from 2005 to 2015. Chart adapted from DHS’ Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 
(2016). 
An increased number of Central Americans arrived at the south Texas border 2014 
seeking asylum from violence, gangs, and economic hardship (Swanson, Torres, Thompson, 
Blue, & Hernandez, 2015; Torzilli et al., 2014; United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, 2015). A large percentage of these asylum seekers consisted of families and 
unaccompanied children—averaging over 62,000 and 45,000 a year respectively from 2014 to 
2016 (USBP 2016a, USBP 2017). Clamor over this immigration “surge” or “crisis” permeated 
news and media outlets and attention was drawn to a “broken border” that challenged state 
sovereignty. However, political posturing—amidst an approaching presidential campaign—
increased attention to the border and agitated a hypervigilance for its securitization. 
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BORDER MAKING 
In 1994 Border Patrol’s Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego and Operation Blockade in 
El Paso were conducted to initiate a new method of border enforcement known as “prevention 
through deterrence” (Dunn, 2009; Nevins, 2002). The operations refocused Border Patrol 
resources to large border cities where the majority of people entered without authorization. 
Fences and surveillance infrastructure were constructed, and agents patrolled the border aimed at 
preventing migrants from crossing. It was acknowledged that prevention through deterrence 
would force migrants to avoid the city and move around them through harsher terrain—also 
recognizing that this may increase deaths (Dunn, 2009). Scholars estimate approximately 1,600 
deaths along the border from 1993-1997 (Eschbach et al., 1999). However, the program did not 
halt illegal entrance to the United States nor did further expansions of the border fence, and 
increases in surveillance. In response the United States, and other countries, developed 
innovative methods for controlling the border: outsourcing enforcement, increased internal 
enforcement, and individual surveillance (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2014).   
Contrary to the idea that borders are hard boundaries of the state’s authority, the United 
States has developed an intricate system that spans across territory and scales (Hiemstra, 2012). 
Modern geopolitics and technology allow for the expansion of borders beyond the physical 
territory of the state (Hiemstra, 2012). President Obama negotiated a deal with Mexico’s 
President Nieto Peña known as Plan Frontera Sur (Hernandez, 2015; Swanson, et al., 2015) to 
enforce the southern border of Mexico to reduce the number of Central Americans reaching the 
United States. In effect the United States established a proxy border within the territory of 
another sovereign state using money and political influence. Furthermore, rail transportation 
industries agreed to increase their speed threefold to deter migrants from riding on top of the cars 
 48 
(Swanson, Torres, Amy, Blue, & Hernández, 2015)—as well as killing those who fell to their 
death on the journey. Under the auspices of national security and by coercing foreign states, the 
borderlands can be extended beyond their legal limits to interdict and contain in foreign territory.  
Legislation also allows the border to be turned in on itself; federal regulation grants 
Border Patrol powers to search at their discretion any vehicle and land—excluding dwellings—
for “illegal aliens” within “a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United 
States.” (8 USC 1357). The ACLU have noted that while there are limitations to their power in 
this space, it is often treated as a “constitution free zone” (Rickerd, n.d.). Anyone found in this 
range within 14 days of entering the country are treated as a border apprehension and subject to 
expedited removal. This “reasonable distance” has been procedurally interpreted as 100 miles 
from the territorial border. The zone is surprisingly large and encompasses a great many large 
metropolitans not traditionally viewed as border towns. The following map (figure 5) displays 
the border zone along with some affected large cities. 
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Figure 5: A map depicting the 100 mile border zone and some major metropolitan areas not 
typically associated with the border. Created using QGIS (2016). 
Another mechanism for interior border enforcement has been the deputation of state 
police to enforce immigration law (Coleman & Kocher, 2011), extending their interior patrol 
beyond even the 100 mile buffer zone. Criminal databases and biometrics are also used to 
identify and monitor unauthorized individuals (Amoore, 2006). The Secure Communities 
program was initiated in 2008 and allows local law enforcement to contribute fingerprints of 
unauthorized people charged with a crime into their federal database. The program was 
suspended from late 2014 until Trump’s reinstatement of the program in 2017 (U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement, n.d.). State and local police can also be granted immigration 
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enforcement privileges under the section 287(g) of the INA (1965)—creating a constitutional 
exception to further target unwanted bodies.   
While optional and contingent on a memorandum of agreement, the delegation of border 
enforcement to the states under section 287(g) (8 U.S.C. § 1357) turns the focus of border 
security inwards. Coleman (2007, p. 619) observes that, “border enforcement activities have 
been supplemented with an increasingly expansive sphere of enforcement practices which 
operate through a variety of local actors at sites far removed from US borders, in the interior.” 
Modern migration policies have circumvented centuries of judicial upholding that immigration 
enforcement is the federal government’s responsibility, converting the entire United States into a 
borderland. This has severe implications for both legal and non-legal residents. The various 
engendered borders prevent Latinos from entering the United States and funnel those who violate 
the territorial sovereignty towards lethal spaces or adversarial immigration courts.  
Contrary to border strengthening and enforcement, Dunn (2009) observes that increased 
efforts have only changed the frequency of migration to and from the home country; the 
increased difficulty in crossing the border has resulted in more migrants permanently settling in 
the United States. There are an estimated 11.2 million unauthorized people living in the United 
States compared with 5.7 million estimated in 1995 (Pew Research Center, 2014)—the same 
time period that has seen unprecedented levels of securitization and enforcement noted by 
President Clinton earlier. 
INEQUALITIES OF IMMIGRATION LEGAL SPACES FOR LATINOS  
An immigration attorney from El Paso, succinctly described the immigration legal space 
for Latinos when he said, “in Mexico human rights are violated by breaking the law and in the 
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United States human rights are violated by implementing the law” (Anonymous immigration 
attorney, 2016). Immigration legal spaces have palpable repercussion for Latinos. The state 
maintains that deportation is not punitive, but an administrative function—coincidentally this 
legal maneuvering justifies preventing mandatory legal representation (Legomsky & Rodriguez, 
2015). However, deportation’s consequences are very real and include family separation, trauma, 
poverty, torture, and death (Hiemstra, 2012; Menjívar & Abrego, 2012; Swanson & Torres, 
2016; Wheatley, 2017). A further injustice of deportation is the unequitable distribution of 
removals depending on nationality. 
Some nations with similar geopolitical problems as Latin America—persistent human 
rights violations, violence, and state impunity—are not experiencing immigration legal space the 
same way. Mexico and China stand in stark contrast in their current experiences with 
immigration legal spaces, despite similar migration geopolitical histories. Anti-Chinese 
immigration has always been strong in the United States, exemplified by exclusionary legislation 
like the Chinese Exclusion Act or The Barred Zone Act, yet currently China has the highest rate 
of defensive asylum—averaging 42% of all refugees since 2014; in contrast Mexico’s has 
averaged 4% in that same period (figure 6). Immigration attorney Jason Dzubow (2013) 
attributes higher asylum rates for Chinese due to U.S. sympathy towards those escaping the one-
child policy, as well as China’s history of human rights violations. He goes on to explain further 
that many Mexican’s do not know their rights and as a result often fail to meet the one year 
deadline to apply for affirmative asylum. This forces Mexicans to apply for defensive asylum 
which has a lesser success rate. However, this points more to a habitual system where Mexicans 
are provided less resources, including information, to gain relief in the United States.  
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Violence in Mexico and Central America is extremely high. Homicide rates in Mexico, 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras (figure 6) far exceed the world median and violence 
against women, children, and LGTBQ are also high (Torzilli et al., 2014; United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, 2015). Furthermore, the rampant disorder, especially for targeted 
groups, are met with impunity or collaboration by state officials (Amnesty International, 2016; 
Torzilli et al., 2014; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2015). Legislatures, and 
President Trump have manipulated this violence to argue for more border enforcement (State 
Homeland Security & Government Affairs Committee, 2017; Trump, 2015), while 
simultaneously failing to recognize the suffering of victims and provide substantial relief. 
 
Figure 6: Latin American homicide rates per 100,000 in comparison to the world median. 
Adapted from the Small Arms Survey’s (n.d.) website. 
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Mexico has over double the rate of homicides than the global average and is undoubtedly 
much higher considering unreported cartel related deaths (Breslow, 2015). Restructuring of 
power between Cartel leaders following the vacuum created by Mexican President Felipe 
Calderon’s declaration of war on crime in 2006 led to the increase in violence (Ravelo, 2011; 
Wright, 2011). The CAT is an argument I posit many Mexicans should qualify for asylum under. 
In my experience as a combat veteran, forensic investigator, and a gang researcher, the Mexican 
cartel’s capacity for brutality are far and above those of any terrorist organization. Despite this 
fact, the percent of Mexicans who gain asylum are in the single digits (figures 7 & 8). 
 
Figure 7: Proportion of total defensive asylum granted to Latinos. DHS Yearbook of 
Immigration Statistics (2016). n = total grants of asylum. 
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Figure 8: Proportion of total affirmative asylum granted to Latinos. DHS Yearbook of 
Immigration Statistics  (2016). n = total grants of asylum. 
Neoliberal economic disruption, natural disasters, and crime proliferate Central America 
causing instability that entices migration (Garni & Weyher, 2013; Torres & Wicks-Asbun, 2014; 
Torzilli et al., 2014). There are also distinctions in the causes and effects of violence within each 
individual country. Honduras’ violence stems largely from its debilitated economy, resulting 
from many years of instability and natural disaster, which have made it vulnerable to 
transnational gang’s exploitation (InSight Crime & Asociación para una Sociedad más Justa, 
2016; Moser & McIlwaine, 2006; Ritter, Moore, Kleiman, & Hawdon, 2011). The decrease in 
violence shown in figure 6 are most likely a result of the Obama Administration’s focus on 
providing funding to rehabilitate economic and youth systems in Honduras instead of meeting 
them with forceful action (Nazario, 2016; Ritter et al., 2011). In contrast El Salvador has relied 
on militarized enforcement. 
Many youth who fled El Salvador’s political instability in the late twentieth century 
arrived in the United States only to become disenfranchised along with other Latinos, causing 
some to join gangs (InSight Crime & Asociación para una Sociedad más Justa, 2016; ICT 2015; 
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State Homeland Security & Government Affairs Committee, 2017). IIRIRA (1996) and the 
deportation campaign waged in subsequent years exchanged civil war instability in Central 
America with United States gang violence as gang members were convicted and then returned to 
countries they hardly knew. Alienated for a second time and without any support network, gang 
affiliation—Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and 18th Street Gang primarily—became their only social 
network (Coutin, 2010; Gonzales, 2013). In time this pattern created the rampant gang problem 
that exists in El Salvador, and other Central American countries; it is further exacerbated by 
United States’ continuous deportations, which provide more disenfranchised youths, and U.S. 
financial and political support for “Super Mano Dura” (Super Heavy Handed) law enforcement 
policies that recycle violence through state policing (Coutin, 2010; Gonzales, 2013). The BIA 
determined in The Matter of Acosta (1985) that unfortunately for the many who try to seek 
asylum in the United States based on “harm arising out of civil strife or anarchy” does not 
qualify.  
Violence aimed at specific groups is of particular importance, because of its ability to 
qualify for asylum. Fear of persecution based on membership in a particular social group 
qualifies for asylum, but it is difficult to prove, narrowly defined, and does not include 
generalized societal violence. The courts have established various restriction to using this 
qualifier: The membership must be based on a shared immutable characteristic, clear internal and 
societal definitions of the group, and the groups persecution must be perceived and experienced 
nation-wide (Legomsky & Rodriguez, 2015, pp. 962–968). This is further exacerbated by the 
fact that identity is a multi-faceted intersection of experiences (Crenshaw, 1991; Nash, 2008) and 
not naturally segregated into one legal definition. Examining violence directed at women (figure 
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9) and LGBTQ people is helpful in understanding the people and structures that together form 
the varied and complex legal system in place in the United States. 
 
Figure 9: Average (2010–2015) female homicide rates per 100,000 in Latin America 
compared to the world median. Chart adapted from Small Arms Survey (n.d.) 
website. 
The U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) (2015) conducted a report that 
interviewed 160 women in the United States who had fled Mexico and Central America. They 
found that 40% of the women interviewed had experiences some sort of violence that they did 
not report to the authorities, because women are afraid of reprisal, traumatized, or are concerned 
about stigmatization (UNHCR 2015). The U.N. Human Development Report (2016) supports 
similar findings—in addition to a worldwide epidemic of violence against women (figures 9 and 
10). Additionally, scholars and activists believe that the number of women who are abused is 
actually much higher than reported (Amnesty International, 2016; UNHCR 2015). Governmental 
corruption and collusion with gangs has rendered the police and security forces useless in 
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preventing violence against women, children, and LGBTQ people (Negete, 2016; Swanson & 
Torres, 2016; Torzilli et al., 2014; UNHCR 2015).  
 
Figure 10: Percentage of Latinas who have experienced intimate or non-intimate partner 
violence. Adapted from the United Nations Human Development Report (United 
Nations Development Programme, 2016) 
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF INEQUALITY WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 
Latino engagements with immigration legal spaces are not only experienced inter-
nationally, but also intra-nationally. The geography of immigration courts—both physically and 
socially—affects outcomes for Mexican and Central Americans. Each court has jurisdiction over 
prisons and detention centers in their general geographical area and individuals are served their 
notice to appear as a function of where they are detained. There are anomalies in this system and 
people can be transferred from detention centers or to other courts, and hearings via video 
teleconference are common. At times courts will have jurisdiction in other states, further 
distorting the organization of legal spaces and introducing regional politics. The magnitude of 
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Mexican and Central American removals from the United States and their geographic 
distributions are illustrated in figures 11 and 12. Demographics, regional politics, and the agency 
of immigration judges are some compelling explanations for variation. 
Shared characteristic in Latino populations suggest a connection to increased levels of 
removal orders. Wong (2012) determined there is a positive correlation between state 
demographics and their law enforcement’s participation with the 287(g) (8 U.S.C. §1357) 
program. His findings revealed that counties with a rapid increase in Latino populations were 
more likely to engage in immigration enforcement, but not those with existing large populations 
(Wong, 2012). Specifically Tennessee, Georgia, Florida, Virginia, and the Carolinas had the 
most counties requesting to participate in immigration enforcement. This Corresponds to the 
high levels of removals despite low Latino populations for those areas in figures 11 and 12—
with the exception of Florida and Virginia who have more courts and judges in their area. Hyper 
enforcement through 287(g) (8 U.S.C. §1357), which Wong (2012) also shows is not related to 
incidents of crime, inundates smaller immigration courts with less resources. Immigration judges 
potentially become desensitized to claims for asylum and other forms of relief when they 
repeatedly hear similar arguments from certain nationalities. They may interpret this as being 
insincere and manufactured by smugglers (Jubany, 2017). Government attorneys are also able to 
build their experience deconstructing a respondent’s defense the more they are exposed to 
similar arguments.  
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Figure 11: Proportion of deportations (removals and voluntary departures) in 2014 who are 
Mexican citizens by immigration court. The proportion of each state’s Mexican 
population for 2014 is provided for context. The map was created using QGIS 
(2016) and data derived from TRAC (n.d.) and the Pew Research Center (Stepler & 
Brown, 2016). 
There is a distinct geographic delineation in the proportion of deportations (removals and 
voluntary departures) between Mexicans and Central Americans. This is partly explained by the 
demographics of the states in which immigration courts are located. Mexicans in general are 
deported at higher rates across the United States, but are magnified along the border where they 
represent more than a quarter of the population. Furthermore, Texas, Arizona, and California are 
where Mexicans have traditionally faced intense resistance and xenophobia—as discussed in 
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chapters two and five. Elevated deportation rates along the border (figure 11) is indicative of the 
prevalence of voluntary departures used by Latinos apprehended there (ACLU, 2014).   
 
Figure 12: Proportion of deportations (removals and voluntary departures) in 2014 who are 
Central Americans by immigration court. The proportion of each state’s hispanic 
population—data includes other non-Mexican nationalities in addition to Central 
Americans—for 2014 is provided for context. The map was created using QGIS 
(2016) and data derived from TRAC (n.d.) and the Pew Research Center (Stepler & 
Brown, 2016). 
 Deportations of Central American are higher in the Eastern and Southeastern United 
States and to some degree reflect the demographics and historical migration patterns of those 
regions (Norma Stoltz Chinchilla & Hamilton, 2000; State Homeland Security & Government 
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Affairs Committee, 2017). Houston is a large hub for Central American migration (Jonas & 
Rodriguez, 2014), but the high rates of deportation in the other sections of Texas are partially 
attributed (figure 12) to the increased number of people seeking asylum as of 2014. There are 
hardly any immigration courts throughout the United States that approve more than 40% of 
asylum cases and none of which are in Texas (TRAC, n.d.).  
Politics play a significant role in the outcome of removal hearings on a macro-scale. 
Chapter three discussed the vulnerability that the immigration judicial body has to political 
influence in the employment process of immigration judges. While biases and judicial discretion 
play a part in all forms of law, the REAL ID (2005) Act emboldens immigration judges to 
exercise their discretion and play an active role in litigation, intensifying the importance of their 
political leanings. Therefore the attorney general and those responsible for assigning immigration 
judges to their respective courts are architects of immigration legal spaces. These manipulations 
of immigration legal spaces to facilitate the removal of Latinos migrants and asylum seekers are 
a “paramount technique for refortifying political, racial, and class-based boundaries” (De 
Genova, 2010, p. 4). 
 Also discussed in chapter three are how the immigration courts are highly susceptible to 
enforcement politics, because they are subordinate to the executive branch. Wong’s (2012, p. 
752) study revealed that “republican majority counties are as high as 5.8 times more likely to 
pursue formal cooperation with ICE under the 287(g) Program than Democrat majority 
counties.” Increased enforcement produces slower courts, more experienced government 
attorneys, and less favorable conditions for gaining relief. Political pressure from the republican 
party to deal with the “surge” of migrants and asylum seekers in Texas has resulted in the 
temporary assignment of immigration judges from the Northeast to deal with “surge” cases 
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(Fertig, 2017). The high rates of removals for Central Americans in the Northeast (figure 12) can 
be explained by the politics of national security and a perceived threat from transnational gangs. 
New York and New Jersey have a great deal of MS-13 activity and as a result these two states 
have become the epicenters for political campaigns to deport gang members (State Homeland 
Security & Government Affairs Committee, 2017). Increased MS-13 activity, amplified by their 
exceptional brutality, has heightened fear and negatively influenced regional sentiment towards 
Latinos, fueling further cries for stronger immigration enforcement.  
The individual beliefs and agency of each immigration judge cannot be discounted in the 
investigation of these regional trends. In any given court, and despite any political influence, 
judges use their knowledge and opinion of the facts and respondent to make decisions. A 
propensity for relief or removal can occur in liberal as well as conservative courts and in 
defiance of general trends. The breakdown of each immigration judge’s asylum denials between 
2011 and 2016 in Chicago and San Antonio’s immigration court are provided in figures 13 and 
14.  
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Figure 13: Chicago immigration court’s asylum denial rates by individual immigration judge 
(fiscal year 2011-2016). Adapted from TRAC (n.d.). 
Chicago’s pie chart (figure 13) shows that some judges had a higher percentage of 
denials, but that the court’s totals were distributed fairly evenly. Judge DiMarzio denied 96% of 
his cases, but he only accounted for a fraction of Chicago’s asylum denials. This could be a 
result of personal biases, or potentially even the types of cases he is responsible for hearing. If 
the majority of his cases are unrepresented and in detention—using virtual teleconferencing—
then the odds for a successful defense are sparse. However, these data represent five years’ worth 
of decisions and therefore raises questions about their reasons for denial. Unfortunately, I was 
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unable to observe any of Judge DiMarzio’s proceedings and cannot speak to the specifics of his 
decisions. 
 
Figure 14: San Antonio immigration court’s asylum denial rates by individual immigration 
judge (fiscal year 2011-2016). Adapted from TRAC (n.d.). 
 San Antonio is an example of how some immigration courts are extremely 
disproportionate in their removal outcomes (figure 14). Judge Burkholder—now retired—denied 
asylum 97% of the time and also accounted for half of the court’s total denials. In comparison, 
judge Burkhart only denied asylum at a rate of 24% and accounted for the smallest number of 
denials. This disparity is so well known among immigration attorneys that their names have 
become a mnemonic for how they are likely to rule; judge Burkhart “has a heart”, and judge 
Burkholder “withholds” relief. Although I was unable to observe Judge Burkholder’s 
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proceedings, our key informants shared a low opinion of him and believed he had been pushed 
into retirement, because of his record. It is difficult to determine the underlying reasons behind 
these ruling differences, however, it is apparent that vagaries exist in the judicial processing of 
people who are seeking sanctuary within the United States.  
Many local factors influence the variation in removal rates across the country, but 
existing literature has focused on national trends (Ramji-Nogales et al., 2009; Swanson & Torres, 
2016; TRAC, 2015). These studies are important, because they identify the rampant and 
ubiquitous inequalities plaguing the U.S. immigration system, but site specific research is also 
necessary to isolate egregious abuses and further campaign for justice. The next chapter 
addresses this issue by providing results from ethnographic research conducted at San Antonio, 
Pearsall, and Chicago’s immigration courts. 
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Chapter 5: Paper Dolls – Finding Asylum and Disposable Bodies 
What does the intimate courtroom environment reveal about the embodied geopolitics of 
immigration legal spaces? The following chapter seeks to interrogate immigration legal spaces 
from a different vantage point occurring in intimate courtroom settings. Courtroom 
ethnography—consisting of observations and interviews—was used to augment the geospatial 
analysis in chapter four. This approach explores both the intimate and global of immigration and 
refugee law and demonstrates how they intertwine in legal spaces. This chapter explores the 
many ways that the courtroom and its social interactions reproduce legal spaces. An overview 
will first be provided of the persisting myths about Latino migrants and asylum seekers, which 
are perpetuated by politicians in order to control their mobility. Second, the spatial layout and 
performative nature of courtroom spaces will be reviewed in order to understand their role in the 
United States’ exercise of power over Latinos. Finally, this research will examine the manner in 
which Latino lives are embodied in case law, which contest and enforce nationalist beliefs about 
migrants and refugees. 
SETTING THE STAGE: MYTHS AND DISEMPOWERMENT 
Myths are one of the driving mechanisms for anti-immigration policy and border 
enforcement. Latinos are often portrayed as an invading force and embodied threat to 
nationalism and security. Some common myths have persisted over the years, often varying in 
intensity and location relative to the geopolitics of the time. Latinos have frequently been 
portrayed as criminals and bandits (Dunn, 2009; Massey, 2014; Nevins, 2002); recently the 
criminal myth has been exacerbated by the United States’ Global War on Terrorism, which has 
linked Latinos with terrorism (Coleman, 2009). Economically Latinos have simultaneously been 
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represented as burdens to social services, and unfair competitors in the labor market (Mountz & 
Hiemstra, 2014). A fairly recent myth—after the Convention on Refugees—is that of the fake 
refugee intent on taking advantage of the hospitality of prosperous states (Jubany, 2017; Mountz, 
2010). These myths not only reconfigure immigration legal spaces in mundane utterances in 
private conversations or throughout popular media, but they also legitimize arguments against 
and judgements on Latinos in courtroom settings.  
Fears of violence and immorality from Latinos are sensationalized through outlaw and 
bandido figures spanning history from Poncho Villa and Chapo Guzman. These symbols of 
lawlessness, which proliferate popular culture and political rhetoric, strengthen the Latino 
criminal narrative. The National Hispanic Media Coalition (Barreto, Manzano, & Segura, 2012, 
p. 5) conducted a study on the portrayal of Latinos in the media; of those polled about, “71% see 
Latinos in criminal or gang member roles very often or sometimes.” Movies, television shows, 
and music portray the borderlands as lawless and dangerous to traverse (Ruiz, 2012). The 
barrage of negative images not only play into the imaginary of citizens, but also affect politicians 
responsible for creating immigration and refugee policy.  
Fear and suspicion are used to transform Latin bodies into the “criminal” and “alien” in 
order to make their exploitation invisible to the public (Mountz, 2015). Stories and hyperbole are 
used by politicians and policy makers to foment fear and anti-immigrant sentiments in order to 
validate border enforcement and migration control. In one example of such practices, security 
contracting firm Colgen reported to the Texas Department of Agriculture that “living and 
conducting business in a Texas border county is tantamount to living in a war zone in which civil 
authorities, law enforcement agencies as well as citizens are under attack around the clock” 
(McCaffret & Scales, 2011, p. 10). This geopolitical assertion is overstated and inaccurate—
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personal experiences in warzones, and several years working with Law Enforcement on the 
United States and Mexico border support my conclusion. However, politicians effectively use 
these fear tactics for border securitization and alienation of Latinos. Donald Trump accused 
Mexicans of “bringing drugs, they are bringing crime, their rapists” (C-Span, 2015) during his 
presidential campaign. Despite receiving substantial criticism for his comment, his views on 
immigration and the construction of a border wall earned him many votes towards winning the 
presidency.  
The direct reaction to the myths surrounding Latinos and the borderland over the last 
thirty years has had dramatic geopolitical impacts for immigration legal spaces and the bodies 
who traverse them. For instance the number of Border Patrol agents has risen from 4,260 in 1994 
to over 20,000 in 2016 (GAO, 1996; CBP 2017) and 800 miles of border wall have been erected 
around urban areas—with political action in motion to finish the other 1200 miles. In an 
additional show of force, the military has been deployed along the border for long term 
surveillance and enforcement at least three times (Dunn, 2009; Mountz, Wright, Miyares, & 
Bailey, 2002). The constant militarization of the border, combined with exaggerating any actual 
incidences of crime, creates a cycle of cause and effect. While there is indeed a criminal element 
to the borderlands it is exacerbated by overreaction and zealous reactionary enforcement 
policies. Limited instances of violence occurring across the vast 2,000 mile long borderland are 
extrapolated by politicians, the media, and popular culture to reify immigration legal spaces.  
The attacks on September 11th, 2001 created a perfect storm for the militarization of the 
border and violent enforcement using immigration law (Menjívar & Abrego, 2012). In 2003 the 
newly created Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency proposed a plan known as 
Operation Endgame (ICE 2003) that would remove every “illegal alien” within 10 years. It cited 
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that this objective fit within the “National Strategy for Homeland Security” aimed at preventing 
terrorist attacks. Although the operation failed to deport every unauthorized person it echoed a 
desperation for security that exists post 9/11. By drawing on the fear of terrorism, politicians 
were able to associate existing anxiety from unauthorized populations thereby equating the 
“illegal alien” with the terrorist (Gonzales, 2013). Another consequence was the need for 
absolute control over legal status under the auspices of national security. The hypersensitivity to 
fear from terrorism, and criminal elements, creates a powerful crisis narrative that allows the 
shifting and transformation of territorial sovereignty to place Latinos outside the protection of 
legal space (Mountz & Hiemstra, 2014).  
The perceived economic burden unauthorized people pose on the United States is another 
persistent myth used to marginalize Latinos (Legomsky & Rodriguez, 2015). Former governor 
Pete Wilson fomented Californian’s angst about a struggling economy in early 90s that resulted 
in the passing of proposition 187, also known as “save our state.” The legislation required 
doctors, teachers, and other civil servants to report and deny any unauthorized person they 
encountered professionally. Proposition 187 re-appropriated medical, educational, and other 
social service institutions into immigration legal spaces—the law was eventually reversed on the 
grounds that states cannot enforce immigration issues (Nevins, 2002). The perceived economic 
instability caused by Latinos was grossly exaggerated and driven by emotionally charged 
rhetoric. A comprehensive report released by the National Academy of Science shows that the 
average Latinos’ wage has hovered at about two thirds of U.S. born workers since 1970 and 
continues to decrease in relation (Blau & Mackie, 2016). The report also revealed that even 
though immigration may initially displace a segment of workers in the job market, ultimately 
U.S. citizens are better off with immigration.  
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The fake refugee is a myth that is particularly strong in today’s society, especially given 
the rise in numbers of asylum seekers worldwide. Several scholars (Anderson, Hollaus, Lindsay, 
& Williamson, 2014; Gibson, 2012; Jubany, 2017) have identified a culture of disbelief that 
permeates those responsible for screening and determining asylum. Jubany (2017) pushes the 
idea further and observes that government officials assume false stories and fraudulent 
documents are often adopted from smugglers to deceive the system, which thereby criminalizes 
asylum seekers by association. 
The bureaucratic system uses the previously discussed myths to foster disbelief in the 
claims of applicants—absolving government officials of their responsibility. The result is a 
skepticism which leads to the belief that the prime motivation for seeking refuge are 
opportunistic and aimed at exploiting resources. During one observed merits hearing, the 
government attorney commented that the only true statement the respondent had made was his 
desire to come to this country to work. His comments not only demonstrate an inculcation of 
disbelief, but also draws on the economic threat myth to exert power over Latinos.  This 
particular asylum hearing involved a Mexican melon field worker (melonero) whose coworkers 
and relative had been killed by “delinquentes,” vernacular for cartels and their associates; the 
head of one of those killed had been thrown into the field as a message to the others. 
Interestingly, the government attorney did not deny high levels of violence in the area, but 
bolstered it by claiming that similar stories appeared every day in Mexican newspapers. His 
tactic was aimed at undermining the respondent’s claims of fear of persecution by insinuating 
that he was not the target, but merely present amongst the generalized violence that exists in 
Mexico. It was the presence, however, of a desire to work that negated the respondent’s 
worthiness of relief; if he had the will to work, he was clearly not broken enough to “deserve” 
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asylum. The definition of refugee in the INA (1965) requires that fear of persecution be the 
primary reason for seeking asylum. The government attorney’s reaction to the respondent’s 
desire to work exemplifies the geopolitical impact myths have over Latinos in immigration legal 
spaces. 
THE CURTAIN FALLS: THE COURTROOM AS PERFORMANCE 
“Everything in a courtroom breathes symbolism. A symbolism of power, hierarchy, 
asymmetry and authority” (Fărcaşiu, 2013, p. 6) 
 
The courtroom is a performance and the courthouse is its stage; it is the foci for mundane 
and embodied geopolitics of immigration legal spaces. The exterior of every courthouse has a 
different feel depending on its location. Both San Antonio and Chicago’s immigration courts are 
located in office buildings that blend in with their respective surroundings. Each court occupies 
one or several floors of these buildings with little advertisement. Their purpose, however, 
becomes clear once the elevator doors open. Security cordons, guards, and metal detectors 
immediately await. The guards are private contractors costumed in all of the regalia and 
equipment of a paramilitary force, but lack the discipline and professionalism. Court hearings are 
generally open to the public, however their intimidating presence prevents many from entering 
this legal space. In one of our courtroom observations, a 24 year old Salvadorian women’s 
family waited in the car for the duration of her asylum merits hearing; it lasted eight hours and 
the temperature in San Antonio was in the nineties. Their loyalty and desire to support Ana at her 
merits hearing motivated them to share that space with her, if even from the parking lot. 
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However, their fear prevented them from crossing the threshold of power and authority that the 
courthouse commands.  
The foreboding presence of deportation in regular immigration court is minor in 
comparison to the courthouse in Pearsall Detention Complex. Located off of Interstate 35 in a 
remote part of Texas just south of San Antonio, the detention complex is a series of cube like 
buildings with high cement walls and chain link fencing enclosing the top. Once inside there are 
a series of lockers for cell phones and other visitor belongings, afterwards a security station 
awaits. A contract security guard runs a desk adjacent to a metal detector with another guard 
observing. Several GEO Group security contractors and other personnel bustle about the waiting 
room just past the metal detectors. Accessing Pearsall’s courtrooms presented an additional step 
than those of non-detention centers. A guard was required to escort us through a large steal door 
and into a man-trap—a secured area between two doors where only one door can be open at a 
time in order to control movement through space. Beyond the mantrap was a short, but sterile, 
bright hallway. Alongside the wall there appeared to be about three doors, each leading into a 
separate courtroom. 
The spatial organization of every immigration court is intentionally laid out to enforce 
power relations (figure 15). The courtroom is divided by a fine wooden gate; performers are on 
one side and the audience is on the other. The physical layout clearly identifies stage positions 
for all its actors. Those not involved in its performance are segregated by an elaborate wooden 
gate with a swinging door. Mohammad (2001, p. 101) defines this frontier as “marking an inside 
from an outside, a boundary that is seen to circumscribe identity, social position and belonging 
and as such marks those who do not belong and hence are excluded.” As such, each seat and 
desk symbolize their occupant’s power and role within the courtroom (Yong, 1985). The judge 
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sits higher than all and in the center of the room to emphasize their supremacy, a position further 
emphasized by their personal chamber through which only they enter and exit the courtroom. 
 
Figure 15: Basic layout and components of an immigration courtroom. Reconstructed from 
observation notes. 
To the left of the judge is the interpreter’s seat. In my observations the interpreter served 
as a semi-present intermediary. They were afforded varying degrees of respect by the judges 
based on rapport and ability. They were also able to transgress legal space by communicating 
directly with, and at times attempting to ease, the respondents. Beyond the scope of this thesis, 
but discussed by Berk-Seligson (2002), I observed that interpreters wield a great deal of power 
over a hearing’s outcome, which will be discussed further below. The Government attorney sits 
opposing the judge on their right, and the respondent and their attorney sit to his left at a separate 
table. The position of these two tables emphasize the combative nature of immigration hearings, 
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and their subservience to the court (judge). To the far right side of the room is the witness stand, 
only a meter and a half away from the respondent’s table. This seat occupies the space most 
visible throughout the courtroom and functions to channel the judgement of the court and 
observers. The witness stand symbolizes the power of the court to extract truth and justice. In 
Ana’s hearing the immigration judge asked the government attorney if she cared whether the 
Ana sat at the table or the witness stand. The government attorney insisted that Ana take the 
stand even though she was no more than one and a half meters away and in no better view at the 
witness stand. The government attorney exercised her power to reconfigure legal space in order 
to create a distance between Ana and her attorney, thereby isolating her during questioning. All 
of these carefully calculated spatial arrangements have an important function in legitimizing the 
state’s judgement and power over Latinos.  
LEGAL CEREMONIES  
Legal scholars (Fărcaşiu, 2013; French, 2009; Gathings & Parrotta, 2013; Yong, 1985) 
have identified the ceremonial characteristics of the courtroom and its proceedings. Trials are an 
elaborate performance steeped in ceremony (Braverman, 2011). Swearing in is a symbolic 
reminder to tell the truth at the cost of livelihood. During Ana’s asylum merits hearing the 
immigration judge continuously harped on the necessity to tell the truth; he warned in a stern and 
threatening manner that she would not like his answer if she did not tell the truth. The patriarchal 
power held over the witness stand is compelling. An imposing official looms over respondent’s 
responses while the risk of deportation weighs in the balance. The immense pressure of every 
single spoken word while in that chair brings to light the full force of the state’s power.  
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Throughout various hearings respondents stumbled or could not answer simple 
questions—such as their grandchildren’s names. My fluency in Spanish allowed me to determine 
when these misunderstandings were the result of the translator’s capabilities and style, but many 
times it could be attributed to the respondent’s anxiety. Translators are not equally proficient in 
their respective language, especially when specialized terminology is used. Berk-Seligson’s 
(2002, pp. 59–60) research on courtroom interpreters identifies that they “are not always as 
effective as persons are led to believe.” This became apparent during the Orozco family’s asylum 
hearing in San Antonio; several key words were translated in a very literal sense which 
minimized their importance. During the hearing the Spanish words “armas,” and “delinquentes” 
were translated either entirely incorrect or out of context. The word “armas” in Spanish is a 
homonym for arms (anatomical), or weapons. The interpreter continuously translated this word 
as “big arms,” significantly less intimidating than its other meaning. The respondent was 
describing the violent acts and threats of “delinquentes,” vernacular for cartel affiliates, armed 
with weapons. Fear of persecution from big armed men is less persuasive than a group of cartel 
members armed with weapons. Alternatively some interpreters are very good at understanding 
the nuances of both the court and respondents, which can work in favor of the respondent. 
 Ordinarily, the courtroom performance begins long before the actors amass in their 
respective positions. Immigration and DHS attorneys read over case files and investigate missing 
information through outside sources. Interviews are conducted not only with the respondent, but 
also with potential witnesses. In best case scenarios, immigration attorneys rehearse their 
questions with the respondent prior to trial in order to minimize confusion once on the stand and 
under the spotlight. The answers are rehearsed based on the statements in the files to which both 
attorneys and the court have access. Despite this preparation, sometimes the intimidation of the 
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courtroom and harshness of confinement can damage their credibility and argument for relief. 
Talia is a 36 year old mother of three and a legal resident who immigrated to the United States 
from Mexico when she was a child. When we met her she was in detention in Pearsall Texas. 
Talia’s immigration attorney recounted her frustration when Talia was unable to follow or 
answer simple questioning during her cancellation of removal hearing. The judge had asked if 
she would respond in Spanish—since an interpreter had been requested—to which she answered 
“yes, your honor”. Amused, the judge responded “that’s in English,” and asked Talia again. 
After responding again in English the judge directly instructed her to respond in Spanish and she 
did from then on. Situations such as these are not all that uncommon, and Talia’s immigration 
attorney explained that many of her clients in detention centers are tired when they arrive at the 
hearing and “fall apart” during questioning. 
HEARING RITUAL 
Litigation is an orchestrated sequence of events similar to scenes in a play, where the 
events are already known, only in court the outcome remains to be revealed. The judicial process 
places individuals in a liminal status between “alien” and legal resident, criminal and secure. In 
this state they are both subject to the law’s force while denied its protection. Immigration 
hearings are adversarial; Immigration attorneys defend the petitioner’s right to relief—if they 
have an attorney—and a government attorney is assigned to attack their credibility and disprove 
their worth. The victor is determined by the immigration judge who scrutinizes truthfulness, 
sincerity, and relevance to the law. A defense attorney is not obligatory, because unauthorized 
bodies rest outside of legal space and its constitutional protections. This is of significance and 
weighs heavily in the success of an application for relief. A study (TRAC, 2015) of 
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predominantly Mexican and Central Americans “women with children” cases found that 97% of 
those without legal representation were ordered deported in contrast to 67% of those with legal 
aid.  
 
Figure 16: Removal hearing’s witness questioning protocol and organization. Created from 
observation notes. 
Figure 16 depicts the general progression of an immigration hearing. Each hearing begins 
with the administrative aspects of the case; discrepancies in paperwork, charges, and scheduling 
are resolved by the judge who enters last minute items into the record. Some judges were less 
formal in their rituals: refusing to recite their actions for the record, instructing people to not 
stand when they entered the room, or interrupting attorneys to expedite proceedings. Experience 
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seemed to affect these behaviors the most. Junior judges were more likely to comply with all 
protocols, whereas senior judges seemed disinterested in ceremony. 
The immigration attorney begins by asking the respondent questions regarding the case; 
the government attorney follows with cross-examination, and it is at this juncture where the 
character of the respondent and strength of the application are deconstructed; redirect and re-
cross examination are available to both parties if they wish to address contentious issues raised 
during their counterpart’s questioning, but new questions are not allowed. If either attorney steps 
outside the boundaries of the legal duel objections may be raised against their questioning.  
Immigration court diverges from most other litigation by allowing the judge to ask the 
witness their own questions. This grants the immigration judge a great deal of power in 
determining the outcome of the hearing. In one instance a judge utilized this time to further 
scrutinize Leti—a single mother who fled her abusive partner in El Salvador—on the testimony 
of her repeated abuse and rape. Leti had been accused by her partner and stigmatized by her 
community for being lesbian. She denied being homosexual and explained that assumptions had 
been made about her, because of how she dressed and for playing on a predominantly lesbian 
soccer team. Nonetheless, her partner felt a moral imperative to “feminize” her through physical 
and sexual violence. The following are excerpts of the immigration judge’s (IJ) questioning of 
Leti (R) (Responses are general translations with direct quotes in quotation marks). 
IJ: Were you injured from the rape? 
R: Yes. 
IJ: How badly? 
R: “Kept bleeding after he did what he did.” 
IJ: On November 21st, how were you injured? 
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R: The same, bruises and bleeding. 
IJ: The next attack on the 25th? 
R: He beat and raped me again, but for the first time he left marks on my face. 
IJ: How long did it take to heal? 
R: I still had bruises the two months I was in Mexico. 
The immigration judge did not rule on Leti’s case that day, but stated she wanted to 
review the information. The judge raised “grave” concerns about Leti’s credibility, because she 
believed such severe rapes would have required medical attention. There was also contestation to 
the dates Leti provided about when she last had sex with her former partner and gave birth to her 
son. The government attorney also raised the inconsistency in dates, but had not focused on the 
brutality of her attacks—he had been the least confrontational of the government attorneys 
observed in other hearings. The ability of the immigration judge to ask questions is problematic; 
in Leti’s case it introduced a second party arguing against her case to stay in the United States, 
an issue exacerbated by the immigration attorney’s lack of power to challenge the judge’s 
questioning.  
The final series in this adversarial performance are the closing statements of both 
attorneys. This is the opportunity for attorneys to make persuasive arguments in favor or 
opposition to the respondent’s claim. These are often the most theatrical moments of the hearing. 
In one instance a government attorney upset by the quantity of documents in the Orozco family’s 
petition for asylum ended his arguments by shouting “eight-hundred pages of smoke your 
honor!” as he slammed the massive brief on the table. Immigration attorneys also use this time to 
evoke emotions in the hope that it will sway the case in their favor. Ana’s attorney confided in us 
after the hearing that she intentionally questioned Ana about her abuse in a manner that would 
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make her cry. Feeling great remorse, she told us that she felt it was necessary to strengthen her 
credibility, because the hearing appeared to be going poorly. The courtroom is an intimate legal 
space rooted in ritual and ceremony where actors play out gendered roles of victims and villains 
(Gathings & Parrotta, 2013). Simultaneously, attire, demeanor, physical characteristics are all 
being judged for their conformity to racial and gendered norms. There is no room for nuance or 
interpretation in these roles, because of the narrow confines and definitions used in immigration 
legal spaces. Is Ana traumatized enough to have been the victim of rape and abuse? Does Leti 
look like a lesbian? The consequences of such an elaborate performance of power is often to the 
disadvantage of Latinos and results in devastating outcomes. Additionally, if asylum seekers do 
not credibly perform the role of the victim they may lose the case and face deportation. 
CASE BY CASE: JUDGING HUMAN WORTH 
Every immigration case file is a manifestation of a human being. Facts and opinions are 
collected and composed to create cases for bodies to be authorized by legal spaces or to be 
expelled from the United States’ territory. The majority of bodies are filed under preexisting 
legal categories in leather bound books and electronic files to be forgotten to the state after 
judgement. However, gradual resistance and litigation occasionally aggregate the experience of 
those individuals to form new laws for their protection. A judge’s novel interpretation of law 
creates a precedence for higher courts to rule in favor and in essence create new laws. Case law 
is one of the few methods of resistance and expressions of agency that Latinos and refugees have 
to combat draconian immigration policy. These personified case laws are increasingly important 
in the defense of Latinos and other marginalized groups as fewer options for relief from 
deportation remain in an ever increasing security state.  
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The geopolitics of immigration legal spaces are evident in the lives of every migrant and 
asylum seeker. Seemingly trivial actions, such as resisting societal ideas about femininity, are in 
reality manifestations of geopolitics. Adjudication is a highly contested social process that 
creates legal spaces and these spaces are constructed with the simple details about a person’s life. 
This is especially true in determining asylum. In The BIA’s ruling in the Matter of Acosta (1985) 
determined that a “particular social group”—the catch all category for gaining asylum—needed 
to be based on an immutable characteristic. The case involve a Salvadorian driver and manager 
of a taxi cooperative known as COTAXI who had been the target of extortion and violence from 
guerrillas in San Salvador based on his position in COTAXI. This decision ensured the state’s 
role in identity creation and the embodiment of asylum. The ruling granted the state power to 
define identities and their legitimacy for relief. This compels immigration attorneys to isolate 
those parts of a respondent’s identity that match the image of a “good” refugee when creating a 
defense. 
In 2014 a Guatemalan woman demonstrated the power of an individual to make 
geopolitical impact and expand the immigration legal space to include a whole new particular 
social group: “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” (Matter 
of A.R.C.G., 2014). This pivotal case law originated from a petition for asylum based on a 
prolonged abusive relationship with her partner. The lynchpin in this case, which separated it 
from other domestic abuse related cases, was the impunity of state. Ana and Leti both explained 
in their hearings that the state viewed domestic abuse as a family problem to be resolved in the 
home. Their families—while not in agreement— normalized these gender inequalities. As a 
result of the legal victory many more Central American women qualify for asylum, and the 
catalyst for this geopolitical shift was the rejection of femininity that required male domination. 
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The cost of victory comes at a steep price and the woman in Matter of A.R.C.G (2014)—who is 
anonymous—underwent a great deal of trauma and pain in order to be scrutinized by the state to 
satisfy national and patriarchal ideations of saving vulnerable women (Fluri, 2011). Case laws 
are not analytical decisions made while drafting legislation; they are the embodiment of pain and 
suffering. These traumas are endured not just once, but also again during the immigration court 
performance so that others may gain legal status. 
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Chapter 6: Closing Statements 
 This research has covered a range of information regarding the history, structure, and 
impacts of immigration legal spaces for Latinos using a feminist geopolitical framework. In 
doing so I have interjected my autobiography to temper my own position of power deriving from 
years of involvement with these systems. Some objectives for this approach included exposing 
the draconian nature of the current U.S. immigration system and to contribute to geopolitical 
literature that emphasizes the importance of embodied scales. The ultimate goal of my research 
is to provide scholarship that aids in the campaign for human rights and deconstructs blind faith 
in a nationalist and securitized state, or at the very least to document these injustices for 
posterity. 
Coincidentally, my project formed amidst an exponentially increasing hostility towards 
Latinos, migrants, refugees, and the many combinations thereof. The future holds many 
questions as to how Trump’s administration will manifest spatially to influence legal outcomes 
for Mexican, Guatemalan, Honduran, and Salvadorians seeking relief from deportation. President 
Trump has stoked a culture of hyper-masculinity, misogyny, racism, and nationalism; recent poll 
analysis shows that black, hispanic, and women voters greatly opposed Trump. White voters 
with little or no college were greatly in his favor compared to the same racial segment with 
degrees (Tyson & Maniam, 2016). It remains to be seen how deeply these prejudicial sentiments 
will penetrate immigration legal spaces and their consequences for Latinos, but his executive 
orders so far foreshadow a tumultuous four years ahead.  
 President Trump issued Executive Order (EO) Border Security and Immigration 
Enforcement Improvements (Kelly, 2017a) and EO Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the 
United States (Kelly, 2017b) that signal a trajectory towards increasing inequality for migrants 
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and asylum seekers. Although it is outside the purview of the president to change the INA 
(1965), he can redirect resources to shift enforcement priorities. The Obama administration made 
minor, but symbolic changes towards immigration reform in favor of focusing on removing those 
out of legal status, which narrowed the scope of the INA’s (1965) ability to target Latinos. 
Trump’s executive orders eliminated those priorities and directed the DHS to fully enforce its 
statutes. Some integral changes to the legislation include indiscriminate prosecution of 
unauthorized people, mandating the prosecution of everyone captured in immigration legal 
spaces, heightened funding for border enforcement and expansion, and maximizing detention. 
Congress has also been infiltrated by extreme nationalism and the fervent urgency for 
securitization. Legislation is currently being voted on, with considerable support, aimed at 
further weaponizing immigration legal spaces. Kate’s Law (2017), named after 32 year old U.S. 
citizen Kathryn Steinle who was murdered by Juan Francisco Lopez-Sanchez who had been 
deported five times, will increase penalties for those who have been previously deported. As the 
law stands currently—passed only in the House of Representatives—those apprehended with 
prior a removal order would be subject to as much as two years imprisonment. Penalties increase 
dramatically if the person has previous convictions; three misdemeanors could result in a 10 year 
prison sentence and penalties escalate to 25 years depending on the extent of their criminal 
record (Kate’s Law, 2017).  Deportations for those who have been previously removed or 
ordered removed accounted for 27% of all outcomes in 2016 (TRAC, n.d.). A great deal of 
Latinos may subsequently have to defend themselves not only against removal, but also 
incarceration before removal.  
The rhetoric revolving around this law is a manifestation of the various ways immigration 
legal spaces are manufactured using nationalist myths and symbols to target Latinos. The use of 
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myths to vilify Latino migrants and asylum seekers is ubiquitous in politics and an overtly 
recognized, yet still effective tactic. Representative Nadler—a democrat from New York—
opposing the bill, succinctly explained Trump and Congress’s manipulation of myths to further 
their political agendas: “First you demonize immigrants, then you dehumanize them, and then 
you label them all as criminals, all of which helps you build public support for removing them 
from the country” (2017). Kate’s law (2017) represents how the tragic slaying of Kathryn Steinle 
has transcended the corporeal violence inflicted on her and has been re-appropriated by the state 
as a mechanism for enacting legal violence on Latinos. Support for accomplishing these tasks are 
wrapped in U.S. nationalist ideas about the protection of women and the need to defend the 
homeland.  
My thesis assumed a broad approach to investigating the socially constructed spaces of 
immigration and asylum law intended for further inquiry in a doctoral program. However, the 
social construction of immigration legal spaces requires a more detailed examination. Additional 
and more comprehensive courtroom ethnographies would amplify the potency of data collected 
about respondent’s experiences in immigration legal spaces. For example, following a migrant or 
asylum seeker’s life course through the process of initial contact with immigration attorneys to 
their repatriation or integration into the United States would provide more dynamic narratives for 
analysis. Unfortunately, a research project such as this would require an intensive investment of 
time and resources considering the asylum process extends over years. However, conducting 
interviews with those who have been through the process and developing their life histories is a 
potential approach for future research. 
The spatial analysis undertaken in my research was broad, often at the national or state 
level. This approach was beneficial in identifying areas to focus my research, such as San Antonio 
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and Pearsall. It was also an effective tool for highlighting power disparities within the immigration 
legal system across the United States. Moving forward, I would like to conduct more complex 
analysis of quantitative legal data in relation to demographics and regional politics to reveal 
patterns of oppression with finer detail. Testing correlations between the political affiliations of 
immigration judges and their patterns of ruling against certain variable can potentially expose 
gender, racial, and other discriminatory biases. As a society we have become accustomed to the 
marginalization of millions of people based on a socially constructed idea about legal status and 
citizenship; 2015 was the first time in 44 years we deported less than half of a million people, but 
that number has started to rise again (figure 2). Continued research into immigration legal spaces 
is crucial in these controversial times to prevent, and ideally end, the dehumanization, 
criminalization, and violent expulsion of the many people fleeing violence.  
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